

THE CPLP AS A MECHANISM OF ACTING FOR BRAZIL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE INCREASE OF COOPERATION, THE CHALLENGES AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF LEADERSHIP

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In fact we're a nation that should think intercontinentally and the South Atlantic leads us to Africa, where everything connects us, from the geographical similarities (climate, soil, vegetation), all the way to the ethnical forces, the historical precedents and economic interests. The South Atlantic unites us to almost all of Western Africa and suggests a policy of intercontinental esplanade, that would improve not only our conditions of protection and security, but our economic alliances and our friendship (Rodrigues 1961, 345-346).

Introduction

Although the historical and cultural approach still serves as justifying reference for the majority of academic and technical production regarding the South Atlantic, a more profound analysis of the sociohistorical, geopolitical and economic realities of the countries which Brazil maintains specific relations with is proposed here, by the nature of Portugal's colonization in both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

The world system, anarchic in its origin, configures itself on actions and decisions made by States, influenced by objective forces that act in this system – the structure, the capacities and the power relations of a specific period – motivating the characteristics and the objectives of the relations

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between States, consequently, the very nature of that system (Brucan 1977, 12). When analyzing the historical continuities and ruptures as a whole, one can obtain a definition of the world system, which aspires to overcome the dichotomy between the internal and external factors in the explanation of its dynamics. The core (hegemonic) and its periphery (subordinated) are concepts of the same world system. In this systemic analysis, the elements are in constant interdependence, and there is no sense in considering independent elements, on one side, and subordinated elements, on another. It is, therefore, in agreement with Wallerstein (1979) and Krippendorff (1979), who identify the focus of analysis in the historical formation of the capitalist world system, where:

[...] **the scientific analysis of international relations must be anchored in an economic-political analysis of society**, that has its starting point and reference point found in the laws that determine the production and reproduction processes of our time, the historical time of the Capitalist Revolution (Krippendorff 1979, 30, **bolded emphasis added**).

The expansion of the capitalist system, since European mercantilism (XVI century), inserted new poles in its structure. Wallerstein (1979) arguments that the core – which allowed for unity in these processes – refers to the division of labor, which, in the capitalist system, exceeds the borders conditioned by the cultural and political structures³. What is interesting to the current research is that the world-system encompasses a capitalist world-economy and a group of Nation-States in a multicultural interstate system. Thus,

[...] **the appropriate unit of analysis for the comprehension of the transformations of the modern world is the world-system** [...], that is, a complex system, with multiple structures, but with an organic unit determined by the division of labor organized by capitalist interests, as well as historical, which originated from the modernity of the long sixteenth century and that passed by various cycles and qualitative changes. (Arienti & Filomeno 2007, 104, **bolded emphasis added**).

A world-economy, in this regard, is composed by a division of labor integrated through the market and not by that of a central political entity, where two or more culturally and politically diverse regions are

³ The same author (1991) exposes that the social systems can be mini-systems or world-systems; the firsts refer to the tribe-like economies, connected by relations of reciprocity, involving an effective division of labor, a sole political entity and culture; the second ones however, are defined as a territorial unit, whose the dynamics of internal forces embrace external areas and integrate them to the expanding system – in other words, its spatial occupancy, determined by the economic base, encompasses political entities, allowing for multiple cultural systems.

economically interdependent. The modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy combined with multiple States that, together, form the world system. According to Vizontini, the world-scale systems, provided of historical continuity and progressive character were only structured after the Commercial Revolution, because

[...] before the fifteenth century, the asymmetries did not possess a systemic character, due to the lack of a world system. It was the construction of capitalism that created the imbalance between nations, in a dialectic perspective (Vizontini 2004, 13).

The international division of labor, result of the establishment of the capitalist world system, converges with the analysis of the world-economy, limiting itself not only to the functional aspect, but also to its spatial dimension. Wallerstein's interpretation is based on the unequal distribution of the product of labor between classes, extending such inequality to the regions that participate in worldwide production; thus creating, in the production and distribution of the surplus of the capitalist world-system, social and regional inequalities that cross themselves⁴.

Therefore, these world systems configure themselves by actions and decisions of the States, influenced by the objective forces that act in these systems (structure, capacities, and relations of power of a determined period), motivating the character and objectives of the relations between States and, consequently, the very nature of the international system (Brucan 1977, 12). Political power, pressure from and for technological interdependence, social change and the self-determination of peoples are the base of inequality between these Nation-States; and inequality (political and economic) is the root of international politics (Brucan 1972, 1978). The disparity between States shapes the world system of a determined period, through power politics⁵, in three possible forms of interactions between States: intimidation/coercion; cooperation/exchange; or integration.

This diversity permeates the configuration of the world system through its dual base of actors (or group of actors): in the core, the central States and, in the periphery, peripheral States (classified as Large, Medium and Small Peripheral States). International and national are two sides integrating the matter of power relations of the State, in the field

⁴ The Core-Periphery relation is based on a division of labor between the many regions of the capitalist world-economy, where the steps of the commercial chains are developed.

⁵ These power politics are oriented by its correspondents, according to Brucan (1972, 14): balance of power, spheres of influence; and his method, the rule of force, the dominance of the weak by the strong, the exploitation of the poor and underdeveloped by the rich and developed

of International Relations and of Political Sciences, respectively. Always connected to each other, national and international will have varying degrees of interaction, in accordance to the historical situation and the States involved in the specific matter. Having identified the need to comprehend such connection, the next step is the analysis of how such interaction is given, from its correspondents, between domestic and foreign policy. It can be noted that there is a preponderance of foreign policy over domestic policy, although it's important to stress that "... there is no act of foreign policy that does not have an aspect of domestic policy" (Duroselle 2000: 56). This is relevant not only to the more important actions of the States, but also to the day-to-day manifestations of international life.

A more precise notion of domestic policy is related to the actions of the State regarding its population, its territory, its government, aspiring to reassure its sovereignty and its recognition by the other actors. Foreign policy, in turn, is understood as the effective action of the national interest translated in state politics (a set of political decisions and practices of the government) directed to other States, deeply dependent on the profound forces (geographical factors, demographic conditions, social and economic forces, nationalism and politics) in the domestic sphere, searching for the insertion of this State in the world system. For Brucan:

[...] the real border between domestic and foreign policies is reflected on both sets of variables [...]: government apparatus and leadership. It's here that real national sovereignty resides, where the truth of autonomy is put to the test. A Nation-State is a sovereign in the world [...] if its decisions are made internally, if they're not imposed or changed by a core of external decisions (Brucan 1972, 28, translated by the authors).

With this reference point, the internal political situation evokes the formulation and execution of a specific foreign policy. Thus, the concept employed by Araújo Castro (1982, 206) is adopted, according to whom foreign policy is the set of guidelines that the country has historically taken to effect in its relations with other States. Every possible connection between the domestic and foreign policies can be made explicit, exclusively, by way of an appreciation of the conditioners that affect each one of the dimensions of state power, in a determined period. It is understood that the formulation of foreign policy is a complex process that involves the relation between actors and structures. In this regard, some conditioners and constraints of the establishment of foreign policy can be identified. One of the factors that effectively exert influence, according to Hill (2003), are the historical events that, in larger or smaller scale, influence the decisions taken in the present. There would be, therefore, three types of historical constraints: a) the matters inserted in the institutions and in the culture of the country,

which, therefore, are almost impossible to be contested; b) the perceptions rooted in society, but that can be altered by one or another generation; e c) more recent conceptions, which can be easily changed without too much resistance.

In such way, in regard to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), it is considered that the historical aspect is an essential factor in the proposal and maintenance of Brazil as an important actor. Brazilian foreign policy has in its agenda, the projection to the South Atlantic as given historically and geographically, naturally getting closer to the ocean bordering countries, both on the South American and African sides. In terms of the historical aspect, understanding the triangular relation, Portugal-Brazil-Africa based on the South Atlantic is fundamental, because, as Costa e Silva puts it, one cannot “[...] write Brazilian History without an outside perspective, a Portuguese perspective and an African perspective” (Costa e Silva 2005, 54). Understanding how the profound forces (geographical factors, demographic conditions, economic forces and nationalism, according to Renouvin & Duroselle 1967) manifest themselves in the countries focused in this analysis, through the historical, political, economic and social transformations, has also shown to be fundamental in analyzing the interests in play in the respective bilateral and multilateral relations. On the two borders of the South Atlantic are established (and mixed together) collective historical and cultural patterns that originated converging societies in terms of ideas and interests, which reflect, necessarily, in the relations established by these pairs.

The contemporary world system has been characterized by a profound reconfiguration, going from an inter-systemic conflict (the Cold War) to the reorganization of the capitalist system (post-Cold War), a historical moment which has been showing intense complexifications in the internal and external spheres of the States. Even when faced with these different conjunctures between 1974 and 2016, the nationalist character of Brazilian foreign activity has been maintained, punctuated on multilateralism (possibility of horizontality and diagonality, without negating the verticality) and in the clash (specific to some internal and external contexts) between situations: accepting the primacy of verticality (North-South relations), privileging horizontality as an autonomous form of insertion in the system (South-South Relations), or, even, adopting a mixture of both positions.

Complementing, in this article, we parted from the premise of analyzing the Brazilian foreign policy in its fragilities (dependency) and its potentialities (autonomy) in relation to the world system. It is also agreed with Lima when claiming that the orientations of Brazilian foreign policy results, simultaneously, from the necessity to stand up when facing the

constraints and vulnerabilities created by the participation of the country in the world economy on one hand, and, on another, by “attempting to seize occasional spaces of maneuvering in this system, with the goal of redefining its insertion” (Soares de Lima 1990, 10).

Complementing Brazilian foreign policy, it is worthwhile to stress that the international bodies represent a voluntary association between countries, constituted by way of a treaty, with the vision of an establishment of a permanent institutional apparatus, with legal personality distinct from that of the constituent States and that aspires to reach mutual interests, by way of cooperation between its members (Seitenfus 2012). According to Dervort (1998) “...the emergence of a global community of nations with a functional group of differentiated institutions for the taking of political decisions and a set of legal principles that define its functions is the most important development of the twentieth century” (Dervort 1998, 9). Thus, the post-Cold War world system has been characterized, among others thing, by an increase in these integration processes and in the search for larger and more qualified bi, tri and multilateral cooperation as an objective of the many nations’ foreign policies, being the CPLP the result of such period.

Cooperation complements the external activity of the States, for it is presented as a form of creation and straightening of the political, economic and cultural ties, as well as offering more international relevance (instrument of influence and credibility). In a special way, cooperation for development, the most characteristic aspect of the CPLP, assumes a more diversified world system in terms of principles, programs and practices, resulting from the different historical experiences.

Therefore, the current matter of research consists in identifying how the CPLP, created in 1996, inserts itself in these natural agenda of the Brazilian foreign policy and that across its 21 years of existence embraced more functions and possibilities of interaction between its member-States. It is questioned, as well, if and how Brazil has been being established as leadership since its creation. As a research generating question, it’s understood that this leadership, although competed with Portugal, has solidified the South Atlantic as an area of Brazilian priority activity in the twenty first century, with moments of higher or lower intensity. In terms of method, the article is classified, because of the objective, as descriptive and explicative research, by way of the hypothetic-deductive method and a qualitative approach. Documental material and specialized, theoretical and historical bibliography were used as sources for analysis.

Dispute for influence in the constitution of the CPLP

The idea of creating a community of countries and peoples that share the Portuguese Language – nations linked by a historical heritage, by the language and by a shared vision on development and democracy – was envisioned by many throughout the years. Concretely, the initial step for the creation of the CPLP took place in November of 1989, in São Luís, the capital of Maranhão, when the Brazilian President José Sarney gathered the heads of state and government of Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as the Special Representative of the President of Angola. The International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP) was thus created in this event, whose goals would be to defend and promote the language; enriching it as a vehicle of culture, education, information and of access to scientific and technological knowledge; to develop the cultural relations between the lusophones; to give incentive to cooperation, research and exchange in the domains of language and culture; and to spread the Orthographic Agreement.

In the 1990's, the CPLP, the re-engagement with Portugal and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZoPACAS) were fundamental to Brazilian foreign policy in the South Atlantic. Briefly stated, the words of Chancellor Lafer point out this multilateral path:

The Brazilian Government has intensified the ties with African countries, especially in the areas of technical, educational and health cooperation. The programs for reduction or forgiving of African debt, not only in the Paris Group but also in a bilateral level, equally reflect the government's effort in corresponding to the expectations of the Brazilian society, solidary to the difficulties faced by the fraternal nations. The valuing of inter-regional dialogue, by way of the Brazilian presence in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, demonstrates the existence of a wide universe of collective interests (Lafer 2001, 192).

In this regard, the constitution of a lusophone community was the main base of this multilateral Brazilian activity towards Africa in the immediate post-Cold War system. Such community was established as a counterpoint to the anglophone and francophone ones, competitive and aggressive to each other (Sobral 1998, 380). Brazil and Portugal have been in a dispute for areas of influence in the South Atlantic since the 1970's, when the language speaking African colonies orchestrated their independencies. The character of the Brazil-Portugal relations, historically consisting of distancing and getting closer, also contribute to the shape and to the phases of implementation of the CPLP. The Brazilian re-engagement with Portugal, started with the quick visit of President-elect Tancredo Neves

to Lisbon, in 1985, furthering with President Sarney, who, in May of 1986, had been to the Portuguese capital, as well as the reception, in 1987, of the Portuguese President, Mario Soares, in Brazil (end of March, beginning of April), broadening during the 1990's. President Fernando Collor de Melo visited Lisboa in February 1990, and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had been to Portugal in July of 1995, when Chancellor Lampreia stated that

[...] reassuring the modern path of the connection between Portugal and Brazil is the point to take from the creation of the CPLP, as well as with our African friends. It is necessary to show the Brazil-Portugal relations in the scope of the modernity of both countries, of their active participation in the respective regions, the MERCOSUL and the EU, and in the release of the CPLP, an enterprise focused on the political and diplomatic projection of the historical and cultural links between the seven Portuguese-speaking countries (Lampreia 1996b, 214).

An important aspect in the creation of the CPLP is in reference to the Brazil-Portugal relation, which is the foundation of the relations inside the CPLP. The character of the Brazil-Portugal relations, historically consisting of distancing and getting closer, also contribute to the shape and the implementing phases of the CPLP. In this regard, the two largest countries of the CPLP, for the same reasons, but in their respective contexts and local-regional-international interests (such as the political influence and economic connections based on their shared history and culture) joined efforts for the establishment of the Community. Although there had been a point of divergence between Brasilia and Lisbon in relation to the format of creation and logistics of the CPLP in the beginning of the 1990's (Rizzi 2014), the lusophone Community was formed based on the cultural aspect, but with clear tones of economy and politics.

The point of divergence between Brazil and Portugal regarding the CPLP was related to the shape that this resulting cooperation would take: Portugal identified the Portugal-Brazil relation in the Portuguese Language African Countries (PALOP), in the “ $2 + 5 = 7$ equation”, considered “ideal”. The Brazilian diplomatic documentation is rich in this regard, for it clarifies the understanding that Brazil had of the multilateral partnership (with the creation of the IILP and then the CPLP), as a “ $7 = 7$ equation”, more “dynamic and positive”. What prevailed, in the understanding of this research, was the Brazilian positioning, which solidified the lusophone Community from a cultural aspect, but with clear tones of economy and politics (Rizzi 2014).

Created in July 17th, 1996, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries emerged as a multilateral organization whose duty is to privilege cooperation between its members, all chosen by the shared language, which

are: Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and, later, East Timor⁶. The idea of carrying out an engagement between countries that had historical and cultural affinities comes from the 1960's (and from the very character of the Friendship and Consultation Treaty of 1953). In the 1960's, the Portuguese government proposed the constitution of a "Luso-Brazilian Community", with the intent to make the Brazilian government review some of its attitudes, that had been taken in the United Nations, against Portugal's colonialism. At the same time, there was an intention to strengthen the bilateral relations, but not even the military government was favorable to this idea, even less the Itamaraty.

Although the essential argument of the CPLP was the valuing of the cultural phenomenon, its real (and dynamic) dimension was politics. In addition to the foundation of the Brasilia-Luanda relation, Brazil had a relative apprehension towards the real character of the PALOP-Portugal relations in the post-Cold War scenario. The Brazilian chancellery identified the diminishing contact with the other side of the Atlantic and was skeptical of the Portuguese actions in the vacuum of power and influence left in the five PALOP (but especially in the smaller ones), as was evident:

The Portuguese Government – which is effectively interested in retaking its presence in the PALOP – recognizes in Brazil a protagonist role in the lusophone community by its pioneering initiatives of political recognition, by its involvement in technical cooperation and formation of human resources and by its significant economic investments, in specific countries of the community.

On the other hand, the political credibility and trustworthiness achieved by the Brazilian government with the PALOP does not translate in an increasing and sustained economic capacity, that would allow and create a foundation for the Brazilian presence in these countries [...]. Thus, as it is of Portugal's national interest to associate with Brazil to, through our political influence, return to having a presence in Africa, it's also of Brazil's national interest to utilize the profound knowledge that Portugal can offer on the region and on the resources [...] that it's capable of moving (BRASEMB Praia, of C nffl 00122 1990 apud Rizzi 2014, 147).

In the beginning of the 1990's, after the changing political-economic situations of the PALOP, Portugal once again took the lead, opening the way to a differentiated relationship between "Lisbon on one side, and Praia and São Tomé on another, hoping that Bissau, Maputo and Luanda, after trailing the democratic path, would follow this new tendency started by Cabo Verde" (Alvaro 1993 apud Rizzi 2014, 148).

⁶ In May 20th, 2002, with the achieving of its independence, Timor-Leste became the eighth member-State of the community.

In this regard, this Portuguese return to the PALOP propelled the creation of the CPLP, just as the Brazilian interest in maintaining the presence achieved in the PALOP, previously, had done. Since the creation of the International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP), in 1989, the Portuguese support for this establishment was without restraints, because the government of Lisbon identified the possibilities that the CPLP would allow in its relation with the old colonies, in Africa and in South America. This objective is seen more clearly in the words of the Brazilian ambassador in Praia, who saw the Portuguese vision of the CPLP as a “fusion of the current 5 plus 1 (Portugal plus PALOP) and its adaptation for Brazil’s entry, in the larger context of the community which would encompass the seven” (Alvaro 1993 apud Rizzi 2014, 148). In other words, forming the CPLP would be relevant and inevitable. The paths that the institution could take were under Brazilian direction, for

[The] institution of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, as it is conceived, can come to be a valuable instrument of political action, but we should advance with a realist perception that in the core of the Community might grow the same rivalry that we observe today in the “Francophonie”, where France and Canada bicker among themselves for the leadership of the movement, although for distinct reasons [...] France (analogue to Portugal in the current matter) for being the birthplace of the French language and culture, Canada (analogue to Brazil), the rich and industrialized country. Mutatis mutandis, Brazil fosters attraction from the PALOP, for being a country of similar origin to theirs, but overall for having been able to develop and boast an industrial complex that Portugal cannot even dream of equaling (Alvaro 1993 apud Rizzi 2014, 148).

Aside from the objectives relative to the promotion for the defense of the Portuguese language and of the cultural relations between member-States, the process of creation of the CPLP ended up, during the Government of President Itamar Franco, encompassing clear political objectives. According to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the CPLP would naturally have a vocation

[...] for becoming a mechanism of political concentration and consultation, destined to give our countries an additional instrument for the coordination of their positions around themes of the international agenda, to promote together their mutual interests and to evaluate, from their own point of view and with a permanent foundation, the evolution of the international political and economic scenery (Cardoso 1993b, 221).

Therefore, if the starting point of the CPLP happened in 1989, the step towards solidification took place in 1994, when the Ministers of Foreign Relations and of Foreign Affairs of the seven founding countries

of the CPLP gathered in Brasilia as an initiative of President Itamar. It was there that the recommendation for the Heads of State to meet with the intent of elaborating a constitutive act of the community, as well as establishing a Permanent Steering Committee (located in Lisbon) to be integrated by the Director General of Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and by the Ambassadors of the other six countries, credited in the Portuguese capital. The activities of this Committee related to the preparation of the constitutive meeting of the Community. As a result of the 22 meetings done by the Committee, the Constitutive Declaration of the CPLP and the Statute of the Community have been established. Chancellor Amorim summed up the essence of the CPLP, effectively:

There has always been, between us (the official Portuguese language countries), a mutual and natural attraction, originated in the spontaneity of our people. But now we are facing a new happening, that compromises our Governments to undertake concrete actions envisioning the expansion of new horizons of political cooperation and coordination (Amorim 1994, 27).

In June 1995, in Lisbon, Portugal, the political and institutional apparatus of the CPLP was defined. The group of Ministers of Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs was now called Permanent Steering Committee and the prevision of April 1996 for the constitutive Summit of the Community was also recommended. On July 17th of the same year, also in Lisbon, the Heads of State and Government of the seven member-countries signed the Constitutive declaration of the CPLP⁷. The then Chancellor Fernando Henrique Cardoso declared in 1993, that the CPLP would not be

[...] moved by sentimentalists. Its creation corresponds to a tendency of the current international scenery with the end of bipolarity, which opened the way to new initiatives of engagement between countries with affinity, sometimes derived from economic interests, other times based on cultural and political values. (Cardoso 1993b, 220).

It can be evidenced that the political-economic and even diplomatic

⁷ The following were established as organs of the Community: the Conference of Heads of State and Government (with the prevision of meeting once every two years); the Council of Foreign Ministers (once a year); the Permanent Steering Committee (ordinary meetings, in Lisbon, once a month); and the Executive Secretariat (the main executive organ of the community, responsible for the implementation of the deliberations emanated from the other organs). In 2002, in the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP, in Brasilia, the Meeting on Focal Points of Cooperation and the Ministerial Meetings was also conceived. As headquarters of the CPLP, the city of Lisbon, Portugal, was chosen in accordance to the Agreement between the Portuguese Government and the CPLP, signed in July 1998, and ratified in March 1999.

goals have been side by side to those of the cultural sphere in the process of creation of the CPLP. Such statement can be verified by enumerating the main objectives of Community, in Article 3 of its Statutes (revised in São Tomé/2001, and Brasília/2002). Where the pillars of the Community can be found:

Art. 3 [...] a) The **political-diplomatic coordination** between its members in terms of international relations, namely for the affirmation of its presence in international forums;

b) Cooperation in all domains, including education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communications, justice, public safety, culture, sports and social communication;

c) The materialization of projects that promote and diffuse the Portuguese Language, specifically, through the International Portuguese Language Institute (CPLP 2002, n/p, **bolded emphasis added**).

Objective a) denotes that the Community was built in an attempt for its member-States to reach a collective international insertion, notably in regard to other international bodies, where there is a tendency to treat large scale themes (such as the environment, organized crime, human rights, United Nations reform and economic integration).

Facing the reduced degree of contact between Brazil and Africa in the 1990-2002 period, Brazilian diplomacy identified in the CPLP a possibility to keep part of these relations, stemming from the argument of technical cooperation. This perception of distancing was visible to the Chancellery, although the possibilities of relaunching were, at that point, few⁸. More than a simple initiative of cooperation from Brazil with the PALOP and Portugal, the CPLP must be understood in the political context it was conceived, in the end of the 1980's, in the end of the Cold War and amidst its consequent conjunctural changes to the world system.

The challenges of the CPLP in the twenty-first century: The Brazil-Portugal relations, new members and expanded cooperation

Brazilian foreign policy, as of 2003, entered a new movement of pro-active politics, revisiting concepts and conceptions of the Independent Foreign Policy (applied to the new international scenery of the twenty-first century), utilizing south-south cooperation as a political and economic

⁸ The Brazilian initiative and proactivity were evident even to the other members of the future Community, as is noted in the Portuguese press of the time, for example (Portugal 1994: 191).

mechanism, allied to the national defense policy. The South Atlantic, as an area of the country's natural interest came back strongly to the Brazilian agenda, be it for the diplomatic-political side, be it for the economic-commercial one or even the security and defense aspect. If the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, launched in 1986, was weakened in the 90's, at the start of the twenty-first century it began to be retaken in its initial conception of keeping the region free of nuclear armaments, and bringing closer together the ocean side countries around themes of geopolitics, security and economy.

In the same environment of bringing back the relevancy of Africa and the South Atlantic to Brazil, the CPLP also further became a priority in Brasilia's agenda, serving as a mechanism of complementation to the bilateral relations. It is agreed, thus, with Miyamoto (2009), for the presence of Brazil in the Community can be understood in two visions:

[...] on one hand, its use to project Brazilian interests abroad, that is, an use of the instrumentation made by Brazilian foreign policy, envisioning to maximize the application of all possible resources, including to occupy larger spaces than the other countries of the community together; on the other hand, it can be, equally inferred that, besides the "pragmatism" in its foreign policy, Brazil also thinks in terms of a joint activity of the CPLP to attend to global interests that wouldn't be achievable individually (Miyamoto 2009, 33).

Therefore, among the main challenges of the Community in the twenty-first century are the pursuit of balance between the influences of Brazil and Portugal in the paths of the organization, the entry of new member-States and the extension of the themes of cooperation, notably in the regional defense and security agenda.

The Brazil-Portugal relations fluctuate for almost two hundred years between continuous engagement and friendship based on the socio-historical aspects and punctual distancing, based on the political-economic competition in the South Atlantic. If the 1970's marked the beginning of the effective approximation of Brazil with the PALOP with its independencies, these also signaled the Portuguese distancing from these countries – by the character of their independence. The three main bilateral treaties (1825, 1953 e 2000) clearly show the primacy of these historical relations, with punctual adaptations to contemporary demands: a) the privileged treatment of traveling or migrating citizens in the other country; b) the fostering of friendship; and c) the autonomy of foreign actions (Cervo 2012).

The bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance, signed April 22nd, 2000 (known as the Treaty of the Millennium) envisages the gathering at annual Summits, meetings of the Ministers of Foreign

Relations and Foreign Affairs and establishes – in place of the Ministerial Commission – the Permanent Luso-Brazilian Commission, with the functioning of the sub-commissions a) about the recognition of academic titles and degrees and for matters relative to the access to professions and their exercise, b) of economic, financial and commercial affairs, c) of education, culture, social communication, science and technology and youth and sports; and d) of consular affairs.

According to Cervo (2012), the contemporary Brazil-Portugal relations are based on two triangles: the first Portugal-European Union-Brazil, based on Portuguese activity integrated in Europe, intending to approximate Brazil with South America (prevalence of the Brazil-Argentina axis and of regional integration); the second triangle is regarded as Portugal-Brazil-CPLP, whose area of activity refers to the South Atlantic. As seen above, the creation of the CPLP in 1996 was a result of the two bigger States' efforts, because without their "solid and collective involvement, Lusophony wouldn't have any reach to the other members of the Community beyond a sparse cultural sense" (Cervo 2012, 91-92).

However, having passed 21 years since its creation, a paradox has been broadly registered in the bilateral political-diplomatic sphere relative to the Community⁹, which extends to the economic sphere. The dispute for leadership in the CPLP and for regional influence (Portugal, in Europe, Brazil, in the South Atlantic), has, on one hand, exposed fragilities of the Community, and on another, made punctual advances possible, advances created by the demands of the other smaller States. It is agreed with Cervo, for

The problem consists, however, in accommodating the collective and bilateral cooperation in favor of the remainder of the members of the community without an eventual conflict for leadership corrupting the purpose and compromising the way of acting of the two more advanced countries in the group (Cervo 2012, 92).

In 2005, the Council of Ministers of the CPLP gathered at Luanda, establishing the categories of Associated Observer and of Consultative Observers. The creation of the statute of the Associated Observer began to

⁹ A punctual example of this intra-organization dispute refers to the recent indication of executive secretary by the member-States, in rotating form, by ascending alphabetical order, with mandates of two years, renewable for two more. In 2016, Portugal considered that, by the Statute, it had fallen upon it to indicate a name for the executive secretary, but some countries, such as Angola, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe and Brazil invoked the existence of a verbal agreement which stated that Lisbon could not be a candidate for the post considering it hosts the headquarters of the organization (São Tomé and Príncipe indicated the new secretary of the CPLP, Maria do Carmo Silveira).

offer opportunities of adhesion for States (or regions) in the Community, by way of agreement with the member-States¹⁰. In July, 2006, Equatorial Guinea achieved status of Associated Observer State of the Community. Its interest in integrating itself as a member-State of the CPLP converged with its current policy of tightening relations with the Portuguese Language African Countries, especially the neighbors São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola.

However, such process of adhesion had a difficult path, criticized by Portugal and supported by Angola and Brazil, taking in consideration that the country had to deepen its knowledge of the Portuguese language (adopted in 2007 as the third official language, along with Spanish and French, introduced in 1998), starting to spread it among its population through programs of teaching and internalization and even cultural actions, because the *fá d'ambô* language, of creole origin (with a similar Portuguese lexical base to that of the São-Toméan creole) is considered the only legacy of the Portuguese language in Equatorial Guinea. The Brazilian support of the Equatorial Guinean adhesion reflects the return of the African policy of the Itamaraty as of 2003, with pragmatic and political actions toward the African continent. As a practical example, the expansion of the Brazilian diplomatic scope to Africa also targeted Equatorial Guinea: in 2005, the Equatorial Guinean Embassy residing in Brazil was opened and in 2006, Brazil established an Embassy residing in Malabo.

The process was not linear and, in 2010, in the Luanda Summit, Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde and São Tomé, all of which had publicly committed with Teodoro Obiang to the accession of Equatorial Guinea, had a clash with the Portuguese diplomacy, which was against the adhesion. In March 2011, the conditions for such adhesion were defined, and among them, the abolition of the death penalty, the democratization of the regime and the teaching of the Portuguese language¹¹. During Equatorial Guinea's

10 In such manner, the candidate-States must share the respective leading principles of the CPLP, mainly in regard to the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect of human rights, as well as pursuing, through their government programs, goals identical to those of the organization. The status of Consultative Observer however, refers to the partnership with some of the institutions of the Civil Society of the member-States, in the sense of facilitating the actions of technical cooperation between these (health, education, culture, sectorial entities and other areas).

11 Another matter refers to the questioning of the international community regarding the motivations of the government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema (in charge since 1979), in adhering as a full member in the Community and in the questionable socio-cultural identification of the Guinean society compared with the remainder of the lusophone societies, as well as the matters referring to the promotion of democracy in the country, guiding foundation of the Community. Questions regarding economy, such as the fact that the country is an oil producer (highest GDP per capita of the African continent) and other

accession process, the clash between the Brazilian positioning (favorable) and the Portuguese one (contrary) was evident, as well as the manner with which each diplomacy used their influence over the other member-States. The biggest rejection considering Malabo's admission was always Portuguese, demanding that the Portuguese language be of general use – beyond the Equatorial Guinean decree of 2007 – and that the death penalty be eliminated. In 2012, in a meeting in Maputo, Portugal maintained the veto, but Brazil, Timor-Leste and São Tomé and Príncipe voted alongside Angola. Finally, in July 23rd, 2014, in the Dili Summit, Equatorial Guinea was admitted as a CPLP member-State, after, in February of the same year, in Maputo, the ministers of Foreign Affairs having recommended this step to the heads of State. Concluding, thus, a process initiated one decade earlier.

Other adhesions have regarded the CPLP since 2005. In the 11th Council of Ministers, in Bissau, in July 2006, the recommendation was made for the attribution of the Statute of Associated Observer to the Republic of the Mauritius (and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea). In 2008, in the 13th Council of Ministers, in Lisbon, Senegal was admitted in these terms. In 2010, in Luanda, the 15th Council of Ministers determined the “Regulation of Associated Observers”, deciding that the category of Associated Observers is made by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. In the 10th Conference of Heads of State and Government, in July 2014, in Dili, the category of Associated Observer was attributed to Georgia, to the Republic of Namibia, Republic of Turkey and Japan. In the 11th Conference of Heads of State and government, which took place October 31st and November 1st, 2016, in Brasilia, the category of Associated Observer was attributed to Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Uruguay.

An important additional aspect is that of the expansion of the themes and conceptions of cooperation in the CPLP. Aside from stating in its Statute as one of the three objectives, this could be considered the main guideline that orients not only the internal relations – between the nine member-States – but also the external ones – between the CPLP and other international actors. According to Bernardino (2008), the organization takes an ever more assertive and global posture, with a much more encompassing field of intervention. In this way, cooperation represents a fundamental instrument of the Community for the development of the States, for its

economic opportunities must also be taken in consideration, because if the Community's main point of action still refers to technical cooperation, this also is shown as an appeal to Equatorial Guinea, be it in the educational or social area, as the interests the country has towards the lusophone countries' experiences are clear: “the Fome Zero program, the Portuguese diplomatic formation and the commercial relations with Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe, according to Anatolio Ndong Mba, representative of the country in the UN”.

consolidation and projection as an international organization (Murargy and Ilharco 2006).

Across its 21 years of existence, the CPLP expanded and strengthened the domain of cooperation under the logic of network. In this regard, a series of efforts can be seen by the organization with the intent of forming an institutional body capable of identifying demands, financing and managing multilateral projects of cooperation. These, even though technic in their majority, are not restricted to such area, encompassing, as well, aspects that require a significant degree of trust and consolidation of the relations between member-States, such as security and defense.

The first document in the field of cooperation, beside the founding texts, was the General Agreement of Cooperation of the Portuguese Language Countries signed in the 3rd Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP, in Praia (Cabo Verde), in 1998, which conducted the implementation of programs and projects of cooperation and, according to Bernardino (2008), served as base for the unraveling of the actions amidst an institutional growth, leading to the origination of the other pillars of the organization.

The member-States had, as a principle, to establish in the scope of the CPLP, guidelines that would regulate the relations of cooperation, in a way that would strengthen the existing interchange and the developing of the members through mutually advantageous cooperation. (CPLP 1998). In this regard, important structures of operationalization of multilateral cooperation were created. In article 4 of the General Agreement a Special Fund is established, destined exclusively for the financing of cooperation and development projects. In 1999, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Relations signed the Regiment of the CPLP Special Fund, concluding the creation of a Public Fund endowed with legal personality and capacity, with financial and administrative autonomy, managed by the Executive Secretary of the CPLP. The capital of the Special Fund¹² consists of voluntary contributions by the members and other sources (international bodies, private sector entities and civil society in general), being able to finance up to 80% of the necessary resources for the implementation of the projects.

In 2002, in the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP, in Brasilia, a revision of the Statute of CPLP (article 4, item "b") was approved, expanding from five (economic, social, cultural, legal and technical-scientific) to twelve thematic areas of cooperation (education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public

¹² The resources destined to the Special Fund are different from those of the mandatory contributions fixated in quotas per country for the functionality of the Executive Secretariat.

administration, communications, justice, public safety, culture, sport and social communication). This increase of the cooperation range provisioned in the Statute granted an institutional apparatus for the initiatives that had already been in development, but were not contemplated by the official documentation. Besides, the expansion of the cooperation sectors indicate the consolidation and furthering of the interchange within the member-States of the CPLP.

In 1998, in the Praia Summit, due to the internal instability of Guinea-Bissau, support for the country was officialized by the organization, initiating diplomatic actions with the intent of contributing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, thus the Contact Group was created, gathering the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Relations to, through way of diplomacy, end the war. The CPLP adopted a preventive diplomacy to manage the internal crises in Africa, thus, the organization pursued important allies in the continent, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), envisioning more integration and dialogue with the African organizations (Bernardino and Leal 2011). In the following year, the Community formed the first Observer Mission to keep up with the referendum on Timor-Leste's self-determination. The credibility obtained in this participation leveraged the international visibility of CPLP's action in terms of the "diplomacy for peace", representing an important milestone regarding security and defense (Bernardino and Leal 2011). The Community has demonstrated growing vocation for Observer Missions; in 2004, during the meeting of the UN Security Council the CPLP was called to speak about the Special Report of the Secretary-General about The UN Mission of Support to East Timor. According to Bernardino (2008), besides representing an important mark for the Community (a baptism of fire in the areas of regional defense and security), this event made the opening of multilateral dialogues in a global level possible for the organization.

Having in mind the positive results of the Contact Group in Guinea-Bissau, as well as the Observer Mission in Timor-Leste, during the 3rd Conference of Heads of State and Government, in Maputo (Mozambique), in the year 2000, the Joint Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Democracy in the Age of Globalization was signed, being the first document to reference cooperation in the area of security and defense, tracing the mechanisms of cooperation, some of which were to:

Further the political-diplomatic coordination on the domains of peace, human rights, assistance to development, international trade and social justice; taking joint responsibility in the defense of the collective values and objectives which concern the security between the nations (CPLP

2000, n/p).

It can be noted that cooperation in the sphere of security, although not being part of the main motivations during the genesis of the community, in virtue of the situations of instability and conflict in some of its member-States, became an area of emerging concern coming to gradually occupy the CPLP's agenda. Across the years, in face of the advances and stagnations, organs, meetings, agreements and projects were created specifically dedicated to cooperation in security and defense.

The Center for Strategic Analysis for security and defense of the CPLP (CAE/CPLP) was created in 1998 in the first Meeting of the Ministers of National Defense of the Countries of the CPLP¹³, however, only in 2002 and 2003, respectively that its Statute and Regulation of Functioning were approved during the 5th and 6th Meeting of the Ministers of National Defense of the CPLP. The CAE/CPLP consists of a headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique, and by the National Nuclei located in each member-State, in their respective Ministries of Defense¹⁴.

The strengthening of the dialogue on the dynamics of security and defense is notorious in the Community, the more expressive example being the "FELINO" Exercises, which consist in a Combined Joint Task Force (FTCC) between the Armed Forces (FFAA) of the nine CPLP States conducted in their territories, concerned with Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. The FELINO 2017 exercises, in their 17th edition, took place in the Agulhas Negras Military Academy (AMAN), in Resende/RJ, gathering military personnel of the nine member-States of the CPLP. The Combined Joint Task Force is made up of representatives from the Brazilian Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Airforce), as well as military personnel coming from Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor-Leste.

The Exercises started in the year 2000, having the first two been

13 The first Meeting of the Ministers of Nation Defense of the Countries of the CPLP was a Portuguese initiative which took place outside of the institutional frames of the Community, noting that Brazil attended only as an observer, and only after 2002, in the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government, in Brasilia, that cooperation in the area of Defense was included in the Statute of the CPLP and the meetings of the Ministers of Defense, began to take place in the same rank as the other ministerial meetings (Figueiredo 2013).

14 The Analysis Center is the organ responsible for promoting research in the areas of strategy considering the needs of the Community's countries, it acts developing studies that make viable the upgrade and application of doctrines and procedures, in the field of defense, of mutual interest to the members. The Center also created an archive, consisting of works relating to its activities, another important goal of the CAE/CPLP is to make possible, by way of the acquired content from its researches, between the member-States, the taking of concerted positions in the many international forums (Estatuto CAE/CPLP 2015).

executed in Portugal (the first being organized by the Portuguese), in the Field Training Exercise format (FTX) having as the main objective to practice the joint action of the forces of the constituent countries of the Community. As of 2004, rotation started and, currently, the Exercises are executed annually alternating between the Command Post Exercise (CPE) and the Field Training Exercise (FTX) formats¹⁵ – in the year of the CPE modality, the scenery used is applied in the FTX of the following year. According to the norms of the CPLP, Brazil, Angola and Portugal would host the FTX type exercises and the remaining nations, the CPE type ones.

The FELINO series was created to normatize the execution of combined joint military exercises, fomenting the interoperability of the Armed Forces of the CPLP's member-States, as well as their training and use in Peace Operations and in humanitarian aid, in the scope of the CPLP or the regional organizations, being, under all circumstances, always under the aegis of the United Nations. Bernardino e Leal (2011) state that the FELINO Exercises are

[...] a reference in the defense component of the Community, being pointed as a good example of institutional growth that has been seen this decade in the CPLP. These were born practically with the defense component, mainly when it was intended to strategically make use of one of the best mechanisms of effective cooperation between the lusophone countries, which constitutes the Technical-Military Cooperation (Bernardino; Leal 2011, 49).

The Exercises have been consolidated as a mechanism of interoperability and operational strengthening of the Armed Forces of the member-States (Bernardino and Leal 2011). Brazil has consolidated the role of the CPLP in its foreign and defense policies, especially as of 2003. Brazil's participation and leadership in the planning and execution of the FELINO Exercises has become a significant mark of this military activity, which happened for the third time in Brazilian territory in 2017.

Hoping to establish the general guidelines and formalize cooperation in the area of security, in 2006, during the "Summit of the Decade", in Bissau, the Community's countries signed the Protocol of Communication of the CPLP in the Defense Domain. Envisioning the promotion of cooperation in this sphere, by way of the systematization and clarification

¹⁵ FELINO 2000 and 2001 - Portugal (FTX); FELINO 2002 - Brazil (FTX); FELINO 2003 - Mozambique (CPE); FELINO 2004 - Angola (FTX); FELINO 2005 - Cabo Verde (CPE); FELINO 2006 - Brazil (FTX); FELINO 2007 - São Tomé e Príncipe (CPE); FELINO 2008 - Portugal (FTX); FELINO 2009 - Mozambique (CPE); FELINO 2010 - Angola (FTX). FELINO 2011 - Timor-Leste (CPE); FELINO 2012 - Mozambique (CPE); FELINO 2013 - Brazil (FTX); FELINO 2014 - Timor-Leste (CPE); FELINO 2015 - Portugal (FTX); FELINO 2016 - Cabo Verde (CPE); FELINO 2017 - Brazil (FTX).

of future activities, creating a collective platform of knowledge regarding Military Defense, contributing thus to the development of the internal capabilities with the objective of strengthening the Armed Forces of the Community's States. In the document, the six organs¹⁶ regarding defense of the CPLP were determined and had their functionality defined. Besides, it can be identified, in article 4 of the Protocol, "the fundamental vectors, that work as mechanisms for the affirmation of the defense component of the CPLP as an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security" (CPLP 2006, 4), bringing together the guiding lines of the Community's activity, such as:

[...] solidarity between the member-States, awareness of the national communities in regard to the importance and the role of the Armed Forces and each of the countries in the defense of their nation, exchange of strategic information, to put it more daringly, sharing of information in hopes of strengthening our countries' defense faced with threats and challenges from the global surroundings, formation of the military, continuity of the FELINO Military Exercises, development of synergies for the reinforcement of the control and supervision of the maritime spaces of each one of our countries and others such as the military health forum, the naval conference and other actions that can reinforce the affirmation of the Defense component of the Community (Azevedo; Bernardino 2016, 31).

The 2006 Protocol, understood as a symbolic mark to the organization indicated that the CPLP, after 10 years of its creation, was already in a consolidated process and that it walked toward the expansion of its purposes (Bernardino and Leal 2011). However, even after more than a decade of signing, the document hadn't come into force, considering it wasn't ratified by all member-States¹⁷, this served to foment reflections that would lead to the Ministers of Defense of the Community's Member-States recommending that the defense domain adopted a "mechanism with a guiding and conceptual character, capable of validating the new initiatives and the multilateral cooperation in this sector. It would be the elaboration of a new structuring instrument also capable of optimizing the synergies of cooperation" (Azevedo and Bernardino 2016). This came to be designated as the identity of the CPLP's Defense Domain, it was approved in 2015 by the Ministers of Defense and ratified in the same year by the Council of

¹⁶ Meeting of the Ministers of National Defense or equivalent of the Member-States; Meeting of the Chiefs of General Staff of the Armed Forces or equivalent of the Member-States; Meeting of the Directors of National Defense Policy or equivalent of the Member-States; Meeting of the Directors of Military Intelligence or equivalent of the Member-States; Center of Strategic Analysis; Permanent Secretariat for Defense Affairs.

¹⁷ Timor-Leste ratified in 2010, Portugal in 2013 and Brazil in 2015.

Ministers of the CPLP.

On the document, Azevedo and Bernardino (2016) highlight that its innovative character, seeing as it gathers the fundamental concepts that encompass the geopolitics and the global surroundings of the member-States, it also proposes to be, in the conceptual aspect, the fundamental matrix of the Defense Domain of the Community:

In the lack of existence of a strategic concept of the CPLP, that document calls attention to the importance of the collective entities, what unites them, what gathers, clarifies and guides them, being that it in the case of Defense, the mutual interests in this sector are what potentializes cooperation in different domains, maximizing collective responses. And this principle obviously applies to the universe of cooperation that is intended for the security segment of the member-States in the South Atlantic. Besides this, the identity matrix of the CPLP can be identified, based on the Constitutive Declaration and in the current Statute of the Community pointing to its fundamental point, strategic cooperation (Azevedo and Bernardino 2016, 30).

The Identity of the CPLP in the Defense Domain, elaborated by the CAE/CPLP, has a fundamental role for the advancing of cooperation in the defense and security sectors of the Community, once it fills a conceptual vacuum of the remaining treaties and protocols that deal with these themes in the organization. The document gives sense to what the member-States identify as dynamics of insecurity and security, and the mutual values that they are willing to protect.

Another point refers to the specificities of the CPLP in the defense domain, in particular the regional insertion of the member-States, as this insertion stimulates the perfecting of intra-CPLP cooperation and projects the Community in the regional contexts, aspect that values it as an organization of global and globalizing dimension:

The surplus value that comes from the participation of the many member-States of the CPLP in regional international organizations of distinct natures, the ocean side condition, a shared cultural matrix and the harmony and success of the military cooperation actions, allows a delineation of a particular identity in this domain, with unique characteristics (CPLP 2015, 8).

As it concludes, the document incites that it is indispensable that this identity, detailed there, materializes in concrete actions, framed by a protocol of adjusted cooperation, which should encompass the already created structures, the dynamics in course and the previous ones (Identidade 2015). These actions were already verified in the following year (2016) in the initiative to revise the Protocol of Cooperation of the CPLP in the Defense

Domain of 2006. This, whose revision was being discussed since 2013 and was approved in 2016 during the Meeting of the Ministers of Defense, in Dili (East-Timor), suffered strong influences from the text on Identity of the CPLP in the Defense Domain, particularly in regard to the punctual characterization of threats, as is evident in the following excerpt:

Conscious that our countries face growing challenges and threats directly affecting the safety of our populations, such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, especially associated with human, arms, and drug trafficking, piracy, cyberattacks, climate change, marine pollution, illegal fishing, among others, which harm the development of each one of our countries and reinforce the need to strengthen and implement efficient mechanisms of cooperation in the scope of the CPLP (Protocolo 2006, 2).

The alterations were made in hope of attending the demand for the creation of new forums and initiatives, in general the addition of article 4 of the Protocol is highlighted, which regards assistance to the population in situations of calamity, natural or technological disasters, as well as, secondarily, combating other non-military threats and risks, defined as a mechanism of joint response to situations of catastrophe in the member countries. The modifications also incorporate the Military Health Forum of the CPLP (FSM) and the Naval Conference of the CPLP (CMCPLP)

Having in mind the cumulated initiatives of the CPLP in the domain of security and defense cooperation, it can be stated that the greatest merit of this work is in regard to conflict prevention. The community has been punctually acting at the level of preventive diplomacy by way of the Contact Groups and Observer Missions, not only with the intent to accompany the internal conflicts in its member-States, as is the case in Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe and in East Timor, but also to actively intervene, in accordance with its capabilities, in their resolution (Figueiredo 2013)¹⁸.

¹⁸ In this regard, the example of joint activity in the process of repeated attempts to stabilize Guinea-Bissau, as of 2011, between the CPLP and the ECOWAS is interesting. Both organizations orchestrated a reform in the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces (assistance in reforming the physical structures and personnel training). In the 92nd Extraordinary Meeting of the Permanent Steering Committee of the CPLP in 2014, Carlos Moura was nominated as the Special Representative of the CPLP in Guinea-Bissau, to locally accompany the evolution of the situation until the completion of the electoral process. The P5 group (UN, African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, European Union) have attentively observed the Bissau-Guinean situation, which is not heading toward a solution since 2015. ECOWAS has been the main mediating organization of the situation, becoming a protagonist in the conduction of the negotiations, in detriment of an observer action by the CPLP, which bases its initiatives in meetings with the parties involved in the conflict. In the 14th Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP the Special Representative of the CPLP in Bissau was extended to July 31st, 2016.

Conflict prevention is vital for stability and sustained development, but also is a fundamental conditioner for the consolidation of the Community, and the CPLP has shown to be capable of fully performing this type of mission, not only in the central core of its member-States, but also in other regions (Figueiredo 2013). When taking on such a significant role the organization is willing to “contribute to the sustained development and security of Africans in Africa, which implies assuming a geopolitical and geostrategic vocation that had always been unconsciously present” (Bernardino and Leal 2011, 31).

Regarding the expansion of cooperation to the field of regional security and defense, correlating the initiatives of the CPLP and the intentions of the ZoPACAS in maintaining the South Atlantic as an area free of nuclear arms:

Situated in four continents and members of different political groups and defense organizations, **our countries find their collective vocation in cooperation and in concertation**. As it generates consensus around programs and perspectives in common, the CPLP will be increasingly more needed in a multipolar world that has as its basic characteristics the coexistence of different political perspectives. And, in **advancing its message of solidarity in the field of defense**, the CPLP will give its contribution so that this coexistence is guided by the best values of humanity (Amorim 2016, 32, **bold emphasis added**).

The South Atlantic has retaken its role of appeal in the configuration of forces of the world system in the twenty-first century, especially by the leaderships on its borders, in the western side, Brazil and in the eastern side, Angola. It is agreed with Pimentel (2000) when stating that:

The CPLP is not the remedy of all evils. It is a political-diplomatic instrument, aimed at promoting the approximation of its members and forging partnerships. It does not replace, but actually complements and strengthens bilateral activity. Its objectives are of long prize, its rules are democratic, its space is open to collaborations with other partners, public and private, intra and extra-zone (Pimentel 2000, 19).

There is, in the twenty first century, a revised notion of the Community's and the ZoPACAS' potential to Brazilian diplomacy in the construction of agreements on the multilateral sphere, mechanisms capable of gathering groups of nations around specific or general themes, looking to favor collective objectives in the global forums. Besides, the CPLP as well as the Zone have the ability to potentially serve as a locus of intersection between the many processes of economic integration happening in the region of the South Atlantic, capable of implementing the interchange between MERCOSUL, SADC and ECOWAS.

Final Considerations

Across its 21 years of existence, the CPLP has been gradually growing (and maturing), in accordance with its initially intended objectives, attracting attention and interest from the international community, with special notoriety in the African continent. With precise actions (and without ostentation), of a more technical-social, cultural and even observer character, the Community has furthered the “collective presence” of its members in the world system, where cooperation is key to the relations between member-States, and between them and the world. It would not be odd if the other States started to show interest toward participating of the CPLP as Associated Observer States, such as Argentina, which solicited the status in June 2017

Great ambitions can be seen in expanding and deepening the domain of cooperation between its member-States, but also between the organization and the other international actors. The creation of a platform of mutual interests by way of the business community and private sector investment can become an active principle bringing to the Community the expansion of its markets and the protection of mutual interests in international negotiations. Under this perspective, the relations between the CPLP and the People’s Republic of China are also inserted, for example. The Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation Between China and the CPLP, also called the “Macau Forum”, created in 2003 by initiative of the Chinese government, with the intent of being a multilateral mechanism of intergovernmental cooperation with the goal of consolidating the commercial and economic interchange between China and the member-States¹⁹: Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Timor-Leste and São Tomé²⁰. Across the five Ministerial Conferences (2003, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2016) the Plans of Action for Economic and Commercial Cooperation were approved, which defined the purposes and the content for the cooperation in the following areas: intergovernmental, commerce, investment and business cooperation, productive capacity,

19 São Tomé e Príncipe was only inserted in 2017 after resuming their diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, previously, it participated in meetings as an observer. Equatorial Guinea has yet to be integrated to the Forum.

20 The Macau Forum received this denomination in virtue of its permanent secretariat being located in the Macau Administrative Region, acting as an instrument of persuasion to Chinese foreign policy, as it brought benefits to the region, such as the promotion of its intercontinental image, the expansion of tourism and the diversification of the economy, including new services related to Lusophony, conserving its autonomy and the region’s prosperity (Veloso 2015).

agriculture, forest, fishing and cattle, infrastructure, energy and natural resources, education and human resources, financial area, cooperation for development, tourism, transportation and communication, culture, radio, movies and television, sports, health, maritime domain, cooperation between provinces and counties (Fórum Macau 2017). Being a new form of transregional cooperation, the Macau Forum acts by establishing regular contacts between the participants as well as making use of the Chinese economic appeal to expand its space of activity in the international scenery and actively contribute to the increase of commercial cooperation between its members. (Veloso 2015).

The CPLP, has not yet been configured as an arrangement exclusively between Chancelleries, it proposes to make viable the interaction between the civil societies of its member-States and other countries/organizations, in the sense of furthering technical cooperation, with goals of socio-economic development of its activities. The deepening of the member-States' interest in the CPLP is evident in Xanana Gusmão's speech in 2014:

Our Community's heterogeneity is part of its primary essence, as it always has. A diversity that resides not only in the very different locations that compose it – from Brazil's immensity to São Tomé's special smallness – and also not in the distinct neighboring surroundings where our nations formed, spread out as we are in four continents. **From this diversity come the greatest challenges and the greatest opportunities for our sense of community.** It's this difference that multiplies our richness and which should be capitalized for benefit of our citizens. In this cultural, economic and geographic mosaic we can find, equally, collective or complementary foundations that could in turn sustain new bridges for cooperation inside our Community and with the different regional poles that we have entered (Gusmão 2014, II, **bold emphasis added**)

Regarding Brazil, it is clear that the CPLP is a vital political mechanism of activity in the South Atlantic, conceived as an area of attention, action and natural interest of the country. Brazilian foreign policy towards the CPLP was analyzed in the aspect of its potentialities (autonomy) in relation to the world system, in the sense of furthering its insertion in this geographical area of influence and natural Brazilian projection. Cooperation has been a mark of the Brazilian foreign policy, especially with the developing nations and the PALOP, specifically. Thus, expanding cooperation in the scope of the CPLP is naturally in accordance with the scope of Brasilia's activity, well solidified since 1986, with the creation of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), which acts in this field, integrating the Itamaraty's actions with the other Brazilian ministries and public organs.

Brazil's priority in the CPLP is identified in the spectrum of the south-south cooperation, in the position of regional leadership and in the

defense of the multipolar world system, based on coalitions made in the South. The sharing between the member-States of the CPLP of the values such as sovereignty, resistance to pressure from economic and political hegemonic forces, as well as projection of a more symmetrical order in the international relations that unite and strengthen the organization (Pereira 2010). Besides this, the South Atlantic has been converting to be a Brazilian priority of interest and activity, as is clear in the evolution of the country's defense documents, since 1996. These potentialities start to become more evident after 2003, with the merging of the actions of foreign policy and national defense. Thus, for example, the National Policy of Defense, of 1996, foresaw cooperation in the "Brazilian regional space" extrapolating the continental mass to the South-American mass, including as well, the South Atlantic (PND 1996, 5). In the updating of the National Policy of Defense (2005, 2012 and 2016) the maintenance of the South Atlantic as a strategic area for Brazil is evident, furthering the specificities of attention and activity as well. In the National Defense Strategy (2012) the relevance of the Minister of Defense's action is clearly stressed when regarding the interaction with the CPLP to "increase inter-regional interaction" (END 2012: 37). In the National Defense Plan, this conception is furthered, when establishing "the Brazilian strategic surrounding as an area of priority interest, which includes South America, the South Atlantic, the West African coastal countries and Antarctica" (PND 2016, 6).

The CPLP and the ZoPACAS tend to consolidate themselves in decisive mechanisms of Brazilian activity of foreign and defense policies. As Brazilian efforts in making the region strategically vital (in geopolitical and economic terms), through south-south cooperation, with domestic actions clearly favorable to such, the remainder of the region's countries also understand the relevancy of more concrete and permanent actions, confronting some analysts' views on the notion of "strategic vacuum". In this regard, if the ZoPACAS tends to be configured as an indispensable secondary instrument for the region, the expansion of cooperation in the areas of defense and security of the CPLP puts it as another mechanism that reaffirms the South Atlantic as a vital geostrategic area in the current world system, attracting the attention of extra-regional powers. In the case of the CPLP, it is worthwhile to highlight the Portuguese interest in being close to their former African colonies, be it by the cultural path, or the political-military one.

Brazil and Portugal, as the two largest member-States and with the most influence and interest in the Community, although with moments of competition in leadership and punctual disagreements, understand the relevance of the organization for the cooperation between its member-States

and for the region of the South Atlantic, for,

[...] this geopolitical and geostrategic instrumentation of historical, cultural and linguistic singularity that characterizes the Luso-Brazilian relationship has two consequences: (i) the end of the so-called “door theory”, according to which, the importance of Portugal in regard to the Luso-Brazilian relationship is connected to its role of link between the other political-economic centers that surround it. (Lopes 2000; Leal 2000); and (ii) the reinforcing of Portugal’s maritime dimension as a counterpoint to its peripheral localization in the European continent (Bessa 2000; Bessa 2004; Carvalho 2004; Moreira 2004) (Barbosa 2008, 13).

This expansion of cooperation is evident, as well, when in the 12th Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP, taken place in July 2017, in Brasilia, the discussion of the Agenda 2030 for the Sustained Development of its countries was finished. In the 11th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Community, in Brasilia, on October 31st and November 1st 2016, the Declaration on the New Strategic Vision of the CPLP (2016-2026) was approved, a document that systemizes the action guiding priorities of the Community in the next decade, demonstrating the vigor of the organization and its development, especially in expanded cooperation and in incentivizing greater proximity between the civil societies of its member-States and of its Associated Observer States

The CPLP, whose creating dates back to the Brazilian initiative, depends in Brasilia’s leadership to overcome the challenges of the twenty-first century and consolidate itself as an essential mechanism of political-diplomatic cooperation and coordination as well as regional defense. Transforming the historical ties based on the South Atlantic in a leverage for the development of the member-States is the challenge of the Community, going from political-diplomatic coordination to expanded cooperation, notoriously in the area of regional security and defense.

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ABSTRACT

In its 21 years of existence, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) has progressively evolved from a multilateral forum of socio-political-diplomatic focus to a geostrategic mechanism focused on the South Atlantic, expanding its activity to other areas, such as security and regional defense. In this regard, the article analyses how this evolution of the status of the CPLP, enveloping more functions and possibilities of interaction between its members and other States and organizations, discussing how Brazil has been established as leadership in the institution since its creation. The current challenges of the Community are brought up, such as the dispute for leadership between Brazil and Portugal, the expansion of cooperation and the entry of new member-States. As a research generating question, it's understood that this leadership, although competed with Portugal, has solidified the South Atlantic as an area of Brazilian priority activity in the twenty first century. In terms of method, the research is classified, because of the objective, as descriptive and explicative, through the hypothetical-deductive method and a qualitative approach, analyzing primary and secondary sources.

KEYWORDS

CPLP; Brazilian foreign policy; South Atlantic.

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