

BUILDING PEACE: ARMY ENGINEERS AS AN ELEMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN SMART POWER AT MINUSTAH

Construindo a paz: a engenharia do exército como elemento de smart power do Brasil na MINUSTAH

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Introdução

The manner in which nations apply their power on the international scenario is a topic of study that has grown in importance with the rise of globalization. States are increasingly exposed to the perception of other actors, whether state actors or not, regarding the methods used to achieve a certain objective. The repercussions arising from these perceptions have impacted the outcome of the actions taken, limiting the freedom of action of states in the pursuit of their interests.

Throughout world history, the form of employment of national power, in general, has performed a displacement movement from a posture of preponderance of the use of force to the use of other methods, more diplomatic, but not so much softer (PAUTASSO, 2011). The use of military power to achieve objectives has its costs, which have increased as States have been organized and improved its military resources. The Thirty Years' War, in particular, led the European continent to reflect on the consequences of the trivialization of the use of force as a strategy of action, which led it to discuss alternative mechanisms for relations between states (KISSINGER, 2015).

Given this, it is possible to verify the ascendancy of other forms of power projection that seek to achieve results by means other than war. These softer forms of action seek to generate power through positive

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attraction, bringing external actors into a sphere of influence of their own through the prospect of mutual gain. When coercive forms of power are combined with attractive forms, then an even more efficient form of power application is achieved—the smart power (NYE, 2011, p. 22-23).

Brazilian diplomacy, throughout the centuries, has made use of coercive and attractive tools to achieve its objectives. The importance of these tools has varied over time, depending on the viewpoint of the elites that led the country and the status of military power, but the deliberate use of both together to generate a synergistic effect has not been common. This situation began to change in the early 21st century, when a conjunction of political and economic factors led Brazil to seek greater prominence in the international scenario (DORATIOTO, 2000; PECEQUILO, 2010; SOUZA, 2014; VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014).

Within this framework, Brazil accepted to be part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Although there is criticism on some aspects related to the effectiveness of peace operations, such as those pointed out by Greenburg (2013) and Serbin and Pont, the participation in this mission contributed to the increase of Brazilian relevance in the international scenario, especially in the UN peace operations. The use of smart power tools, as stated by Seitenfus (2008), Silva (2011), Bracey (2011), Nasser (2012), Muxagato (2014), Cezne (2016), and Rodrigues and Migon (2017), among others, was a relevant differential in obtaining this framework.⁴ This paper proposes to launch a look at the role of the military component in the construction of smart power and, in particular, the differential caused by engineering troops in this process.

The Peace Force Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY) was part of the Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH. Its first contingent arrived in Haiti in 2005 to provide engineering support to the military forces of the various countries deployed in the context of the mission and carry out local development work. With personnel ranging from 150 to 250 members, the company had a total of 23 contingents, in which around 4,500 Brazilian military personnel developed typical engineering activities, such as earthworks, drainage, paving of roads, and assembly of prefabricated structures, on Haitian territory (BRASIL, 2018). Their employment was directly controlled by the Force Commander⁵ of the mission—a Brazilian general officer—despite being linked to the national contingent for administrative and logistical purposes (FARIAS, 2017, p. 54).

This article will analyze how Brazil used, in MINUSTAH, a combination of its engineering troops with other military means to achieve the smart power effect proposed by Nye (2011). To this end, an analysis of the end of mission reports of several contingents of BRAENGCOY was conducted to unveil the work done by this troop that contributed to generating a sense of attraction in the local population. By combining this feeling of attraction with the actions of the base branch troops⁶ in achieving a safe and stable environment, the Brazilian troops managed to generate the synergistic effects of smart power, thus obtaining a greater acceptance of their presence from the local population, and increasing the country's prestige internationally.

⁴ For a broader review in the literature on the topic, it is suggested to read Abdenur et al. (2017)

⁵ The name that is given, within a UN peacekeeping mission, to the commander of the military component of the mission.

⁶ In military vocabulary, branches group the specializations focused on the execution of combat, and are subdivided into base branches - Infantry and Cavalry - and combat support branches - Artillery, Engineering, and Communications.

Literature review: hard, soft and smart power

In questioning what Americans could do better as they entered the 20th century, in "The Paradox of American Power," Joseph Nye (2003) agrees that one should not make predictions about the future, but one must have pictures of the future that can guide policy and thus avoid common mistakes, because after all, systems involve complex interactions and consequently generate diverse reactions. Furthermore, he warns of the danger of an isolationist policy on the part of the United States, and considers that even militarily, despite being a superpower, they should rarely intervene alone (NYE, 2003, p. 33), rather they should create situations to strengthen alliances. That said, according to Nye (2003, p. 159), the key to American longevity is multilateralism, as it reduces the incentives for building alliances against it and consequently enables the cooperation of other countries to achieve its goals.

In this regard, the author considers an examination of the sources of American power necessary. But after all, what would this power be? For Nye (2003, p. 4) "power is the ability to get the outcomes you want, and if necessary, change the behaviour of others to make it happen." From this logic, power is commonly defined as the ability of a state to possess elements such as "population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military might, and political stability" (NYE, 2003, p. 5).

The ability to produce war was seen as a relative demonstration of the source of states' power. However, "over the centuries, as technologies have evolved, the sources of power have changed" (NYE, 2003, p. 5) thus moving the emphasis away from military force, especially since the use of force tends to compromise countries' economic goals.

In "The Future of Power" Nye (2011) argues that the problem that states (even the most powerful) will face in the 21st century concerns the fact that they will increasingly have to deal with issues beyond their control. Nye calls these transformations that are happening at the global level "power transition" and "power diffusion"; the first one to explain the shift of power among states and the second one the shift of power away from states to non-state actors.

In this sense, Nye has shown that the dimensions of power (now more subjective) are much broader and that classical narratives can no longer account for them. What is perceived as a national power, in a material focus, such as population, technology, or material resources, Nye defines as mere instruments of power, useful for specific purposes, but useless if incorrectly employed. In its relational viewpoint, power is the ability to alter the behaviour of other actors to produce preferred outcomes (NYE, 2009).

That said, Nye defines what he calls "The Three Faces of Relational Power". The first face, which is easier to observe, refers to the use of force to change an actor's attitude. Through threats or rewards this actor is coerced to change his preferred strategy in order to meet a desired effect by the power wielder. This form of action makes the action of the agent exerting pressure on his target quite explicit (NYE, 2011, p. 11).

The second face refers to the ability to control the agenda. A nation with the power to determine the agenda of issues or courses of action that will be on the agenda has the power to limit the choice of the weaker ones, manipulating the directions of the choices to be made. In this situation, the influence of the agent's power is more subtle, and may or may not be perceived by the other actors (NYE, 2011, p. 13).

The third and last face is exercised by preference creation. The agent of power influences his target in such a way that the target makes choices that benefit the agent, unconsciously, by creating tendencies, preferences, and desires. The successful use of this form of power makes the target unaware of the power wielded by the agent, as the goals of both become the same (NYE, 2011, p. 13).

The first face of power is preponderant in hard power. The use of military or economic threats on a target as a way to influence its actions, in an intimidating attitude, is what characterizes this type of power. Even the use of economic rewards, with the threat that they can be withdrawn in case of mistreatment, can be perceived in this way. Although direct and effective, this type of power does not guarantee long-term results, because it tends to produce, in a collateral way, dissent, revolt, fear, and disgust (CAMPBELL; O'HANLON, 2007; COOPER, 2004; WILSON, 2008).

The concept of soft power, in turn, was brought by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s and gained strength after September 11, 2001. Soft power makes heavy use of the *modus operandi* of the second and third faces, relying mainly on culture, political values, and international relations. Through the power of attraction or agenda setting the state can create an aura of positive perception, which helps it more easily conquer its goals (NYE, 2011, 2015). Canada, with its image as a pacifist, welcoming country and defender of minority rights, is an example of the use of soft power (POTTER, 2009). Despite using a more subtle approach, the results achieved through soft power tend to be more lasting in the long run because they generate consensus, sympathy, and goodwill of public opinion for the agent (VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014).

However, soft power should not be seen as a solution to all problems, as noted by the unsuccessful U.S. attempts to disassociate the Taliban from Al Qaeda in Afghanistan through diplomatic channels (NYE, 2009). Even if begrudgingly, an actor may be forced to yield to the harassment of a dominant power under the threat of its war power or economic power, even if its initial preference was drawn to another actor through soft power.

To solve the dilemma of how to exercise the use of power in an effective and lasting way, Nye developed the concept of smart power in 2003. The author presents it as a strategy of combining hard and soft power, in a given context, in order to achieve defined goals. Through the coordinated and synergistic use of tools from both types of power, it is possible to achieve a consistent result, in a context that combines the respect imposed by the use of force with the emotional attraction that enables stability over time (NYE, 2009, 2011; WILSON, 2008).

According to Nye, to achieve a smart power strategy, states need to have clarity about (tangible) goals that combine values and interests, only then to make an "accurate survey of available resources and assess how those resources will change" (NYE, 2011, p. 222) under given circumstances. After all, "smart power means knowing the strengths and limitations of each instrument" (WILSON, 2008). Furthermore, it is necessary to assess the resources and preferences of the targets one intends to influence (NYE, 2011, p. 224).

From this, one must choose among the power behaviours (economic, soft power), and adjust the tactics so that they reinforce each other (NYE, 2011, p. 225). Finally, a smart power strategy requires a careful

assessment of the likelihood of success in achieving the goals set initially and this, according to Nye, demands "a clear assessment of international boundaries" (2011, p. 229).

Brazilian foreign policy has, for most of its history, been characterized by the use of soft power, using more actively strategies of persuasion and consensus building. Although the use of hard power tools can be seen in some passages in the country's history, especially when its fundamental interests were at stake, these events were the exception rather than the rule. In the late 20th century, especially since the 1980s, the use of soft power tools reigned absolute in the nation's quest for the desired global insertion (LUJÁN, 2016; SILVA, 2012; VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014).

At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil went through a particularly favourable moment in its history. A conjuncture of domestic factors, such as economic stabilization, and external ones, such as the increase in commodity prices in the international market, led Brazil to emerge as a nation on the rise in the global scenario. In addition to this, the arrival of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as President of the Republic promoted a change in national foreign policy, which began to aim for a greater role in the international arena. The country's new posture sought to demonstrate capabilities of military power projection and leadership in humanitarian support missions under the aegis of the UN, thus showing strength and political will to work for the common good in cooperation with multilateral organizations. Within this framework, the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH played a prominent role in the development of national smart power (MOREIRA JR, 2012; PAUTASSO, 2011; PINTO, 2011; VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014).

Brazilian hard power employed in MINUSTAH

According to Cavalcanti (2014), Brazil arrived in MINUSTAH in 2004 in a situation of severe social breakdown where Haiti's elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was deposed and the interim government had requested international intervention to restore the country's internal cohesion. The initial contingent was made up of the Haiti Brigade, a force of 1,200 men from the Southern Military Command, later replaced by the Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion (Brazilian Battalion - BRABAT), the Marine Operating Group (Brazilian Marines - BRAMAR), and the Peacekeeping Engineering Company (Brazilian Engineering Company - BRAENGCOY).

One aspect of great relevance to Brazil's military participation in Haiti was the emergence of the Capstone Doctrine. This doctrine, derived from the experiences of the unsuccessful UN missions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, gathered in the Brahimi Report, inaugurated a new paradigm for the use of force in peacekeeping missions. Under this legal framework, Brazil operated in Haiti making active use of force, including lethal force, to enforce compliance with its mandate, in what has been called robust peace operations (BIGATÃO, 2017; KARLSRUD, 2015).

During its stay in Haiti, Brazil operated with an effective that varied over time, depending on its mandates and the needs of the mission, starting from an initial effective of 1,200 military of the Haiti Brigade (VIEIRA NETO, 2017) and reaching the apex of 2,188 militaries with the activation of BRABAT 2 (UN, 2011). As far as the BRABAT and BRAMAR forces are concerned, their employment occurred in a limited space, that

is, within an area of responsibility, and with the main purpose of obtaining and maintaining a safe and stable environment, so that the other components of the mission (police and civilian) could carry out their activities (WALKER, 2018). In order to facilitate the study of the forms of action of the pacification forces, we will divide the mission into four phases:

- 1st Phase – Peace enforcement (2004 to 2007): from the arrival of troops in Haiti until the achievement of a safe and stable environment;
- 2nd Phase – Peacekeeping (2007 to 2010): from achieving the safe and stable environment until the 2010 earthquake;
- 3rd Phase – Humanitarian Support (2010 to 2013): from the 2010 earthquake to the demobilization of BRABAT 2;
- 4th Phase – Reduction and Demobilization (2013 to 2017): from the demobilization of BRABAT 2 to the full return of Brazilian troops from MINUSTAH (24th contingent).

During the first phase, the Brazilian troops acted mainly in confronting criminal gangs and in training the Haitian National Police (*Police Nationale d'Haïti* – PNH). The actions focused on patrolling slums and establishing checkpoints on major highways, aiming to arrest gang leaders in addition to combat actions aimed at retaking parts of the city under the control of criminals, such as the neighborhoods of *Bel Air*, *Cité Soleil*, and *Cité Militaire* (LIMA, 2017). Search and seizure operations, area isolation and interdiction, and the establishment of checkpoints and strong points were types of tactical actions that were widely used. The use of lethal force to fulfil the mandate was a reality in this scenario, always based on the rules of engagement and Status of Force Agreements (SOFA) (CAVALCANTI, 2014; LESSA, 2007).

In this scenario, the operations *Punho de Ferro* (July 2005), *Casa Azul* (January 2007), and *Jauru Sudamericano* (February 2007) stand out. The first one was aimed at neutralizing gang leader Emmanuel Terror Wilme and became a milestone in UN peace operations because, for the first time, lethal force was actively used to achieve the mission's mandate. The other two served to consolidate the military occupation of *Cité Militaire* and National Route 1, and occurred during the period of General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz's command as Force Commander of MINUSTAH (CAVALCANTI, 2014; LESSA, 2007).

Once a secure and stable environment has been achieved, the second phase of the mission, peacekeeping, begins. This phase was characterized by the pursuit of a more active role for the police (United Nations Police – UNPOL) and civilian contingents of the mission, as well as an emphasis on the employment of PNH for the achievement of police activity. Even with this change in focus, the military contingent remained active. The same types of operations that were carried out in the previous phase continued to occur, but with a greater preponderance of the use of less lethal means, within a philosophy of progressive use of force, and with a greater and more constant participation of UNPOL and PNH elements. Disturbance control actions also began to occur more frequently at this stage (CAVALCANTI, 2014).

On January 12, 2010, an earthquake measuring 7 on the Richter scale struck Haiti, leaving the country's capital, Port-au-Prince, in a state of calamity. A large number of buildings were destroyed, among them the prison that housed a large number of former members of the gangs that ravaged the country.

Thousands of people were injured and millions were left homeless, concentrated in several displacement camps. In this environment, MINUSTAH troops had to act to, at first, contain the humanitarian effects of the catastrophe, as well as avoid the scenario of social breakdown that threatened to settle in and make all stabilization efforts achieved by the mission regress (MORAES; ANDRADE; MATTOS, 2013; PATRIOTA, 2010).

Once the first impact had passed, the troops then turned to the reconstruction effort. The chaotic environment that was established after the earthquake led to a reversal of the picture of stability that had been achieved. MINUSTAH, which was already preparing to enter a downsizing phase⁷, needed to be reinforced and, with the authorization of the UN Security Council, Brazil increased its contingent by mobilizing and activating BRABAT 2 and reinforcing BRAENGCOY in personnel and material. The management of IDP camps took on a critical role for all mission components (CAVALCANTI, 2014; LIMA, 2017).

In this third phase, which began after the earthquake, the troops are again heavily involved in gang repression, risk area patrols, especially in refuge areas for fugitives, and in looting containment. Search and seizure, siege and isolation operations, and short-term actions in conflicted areas were carried out continuously, so that by the end of three months, about 120 gang members had been recaptured (LIMA, 2017). This new phase, characterized by a high intensity of military operations occurring in parallel with a humanitarian and reconstruction effort in the country, extended until 2013—the year in which BRABAT 2 was demobilized—the moment in which the UN understood that the mission had reached levels of stability close to those before the earthquake, and the Brazilian military contingent began to be gradually reduced until we reached the end of Brazilian military participation in MINUSTAH, in 2017 (WALKER, 2018).

It is also worth noting that the logistical support of Brazilian troops in Haiti, as defined by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), was provided in the form of a wet lease. Through this system, Brazil committed itself before the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to employ its own equipment and weaponry in the mission, to be responsible for the maintenance of this material, which includes repair, exchange and resupply, as well as the establishment of its own logistics chain, being partially reimbursed for this (SILVA, 2018; UN, 2017). In this way, Brazil kept, for more than ten years and with its own means, its troops in an area of operations more than 4,000 km away from its national territory.

Summarizing the facts presented, it can be said that Brazil kept an expressive military contingent in a country far from its national territory for thirteen years, supported by its own logistical capacity. If we observe this fact from the perspective of the new foreign policy positioning of the government of the time, as explained in the previous section, we will see that the Brazilian military participation served as a demonstration of the country's strength (SILVA, 2011; VALENÇA; CARVALHO, 2014). Brazil has shown itself capable of projecting power outside its territory, carrying out offensive operations against hostile groups, and

⁷ Downsizing is the period when a mission, when it considers that it has achieved its objectives, starts to reduce its personnel and begins the transition of its functions to local authorities.

leading a group of countries of different cultures to achieve a defined military objective. Through this demonstration of force, Brazil showed the world that it possessed enough hard power to apply for the role of a global player with weight proportional to its economic and territorial status.

BRAENCOY's performance data for the benefit of the population

Having analyzed the Brazilian hard power expressed in the mission, the next step is to study how the engineering company was used to build the soft power, by carrying out works that had a direct or indirect impact on the population's quality of life. To this end, an analysis of the mission end reports of 17 of the 22 BRAENCOY contingents was conducted. The analysis work followed the methodology proposed by Bardin (2016), consisting of three steps: pre-analysis; exploration and treatment of results; and inferences and interpretations.

In the first phase, floating reading⁸ and the selection of the documents to be analyzed were performed. To this end, the rules of completeness, representativeness, homogeneity, and relevance⁹ were considered (BARDIN, 2016). From this analysis, the following documents were selected:

Table 1 – List of analyzed documents

No.	Title	Data	Cont.
01	Final Operation Report	06/07/2006	2nd
02	Final Operation Report - 3rd Contingent	12/18/2006	3rd
03	Final Operation Report - 4th Contingent	06/15/2007	4th
04	6th Contingent's Mission Ending Report	06/05/2008	6th
05	7th Contingent End of Mission Report	12/02/2008	7th
06	8th Contingent End of Mission Report	06/09/2009	8th
07	9th Contingent End of Mission Report	02/05/2010	9th
08	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/12	09/12/2010	12th
09	14th Contingent End of Mission Report	09/10/2011	14th
10	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/15	04/18/2012	15th
11	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/16	12/03/2012	16th
12	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/17	06/07/2013	17th
13	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/19	06/04/2014	19th
14	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/20	12/04/2014	20th
15	End of Mission Report - Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti/21	06/01/2015	21st
16	Presentation of the Final Operations Report of the 22nd Contingent of the Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company - Haiti	Not Informed	22nd

⁸ Floating reading consists of the first contact with the text to be analyzed, getting to know it. It allows the analyst to gain an initial idea about the material, formulate hypotheses, and design the first classes of analysis.

⁹ Set of rules proposed by Bardin (2016) to select the corpus of analysis. Exhaustiveness refers to taking into account all the elements of the corpus, not leaving out any element without a rigorous justification; representativeness refers to the quantity of material, so that it is a representative part of the whole; homogeneity consists in seeking to establish precise criteria of choice, not presenting too much singularity outside these criteria; pertinence refers to the adequacy of the material, which must correspond to the objectives of the analysis.

17	End of Mission Report 25th Contingent of the Brazilian Peacekeeping Engineering Company – Haiti	06/02/2017	25th
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Source: (Own elaboration based on BRASIL [2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015a, 2017]).

Through the floating reading of the documents, the following categories were developed for classification of the papers:

1. Drilling of wells: in this category were considered the wells dug either for direct service to the community, for NGOs or for MINUSTAH bases. The latter is due to the fact that most of the time these wells, even though they were on private or mission land, also served the community and remained on the land after the bases were deactivated;
2. Road paving: includes asphalt paving work on public roads, or asphalt patching services, improving the quality of already existing roads;
3. Improving the country's infrastructure: comprises work that has in some way expanded Haiti's infrastructure supply. Includes earthworks, drainage, repair of dirt roads, opening of accesses, and other related services;
4. Improvement of government facilities: works aimed at building, restoring, or expanding government facilities, which enabled state agents to provide better services to citizens, or other actions in direct support of the Haitian government, such as actions to support the electoral process.
5. Destruction of explosive artefacts: actions carried out by the Explosive Artifacts Destruction Team in the neutralization and destruction of explosive artifacts found in risk areas;
6. Clearance of streets and cleaning of urban areas: works aimed at improving the circulation or the sanitary state of the urban environment by removing debris originating from diverse causes such as the accumulation of garbage, landslides, blockages, etc;
7. Support to NGOs and other humanitarian actors: actions carried out in favour of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or other humanitarian actors that were not directly subordinated to MINUSTAH command (such as the UN Country Teams – UNCT), and aimed at meeting the immediate needs of the population;
8. Support or Execution of QIP or ACISO: actions carried out directly on behalf of the local population through Quick Impact Projects (QIP) or Civic and Social Actions (*Ações Cívico Sociais* – ACISO), conducted by BRAENGCOY or other units, provided that the BRAENGCOY image was associated;
9. Humanitarian actions in response to natural disasters: actions carried out as a result of humanitarian demands generated by natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake and the passage of hurricanes;
10. River Patrol: support in boat transportation for troops patrolling the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the Lake Azuei region, aimed at inhibiting transnational illicit activities. Once the initial pre-analysis phase was completed, the material was cut and classified within the categories of analysis, resulting in raw data that was treated according to the following index:

Tabela 2 – Data processing indexes

Index	Criterion
Yes	Contingents where was found at least one indication of work done related to the category
No	Contingents where explicit information was found that the work related to this category was not executed
N.I.	Not informed. Contingents where it was not possible to verify whether work related to this category was carried out or not

Source: (Own elaboration).

The following information was obtained from the processing of the raw data:

Tabela 3a - Work done, by contingent

Contingent	Category									
	2	3	4	6	7	8	9	12	14	
Well drilling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Road paving	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Improving the country's infrastructure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Improving government facilities	Yes	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	No	No	Yes	N.I.	N.I.
Destruction of explosive artifacts	Yes	N.I.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Clearing of roads and cleaning of urban areas	Yes	N.I.	Yes	Yes	N.I.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Support to NGOs and other humanitarian actors	N.I.	N.I.	Yes	Yes	N.I.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Support or Execution of QIP or ACISO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.I.	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Humanitarian actions in response to disasters	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	No	No	Yes	N.I.	N.I.
River Patrol	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: (Own elaboration based on BRASIL [2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015a, 2017]).

Table 3b - Work done, by contingent (continued)

Contingent	Category									tal
	15	16	17	19	20	21	22	25		
Well drilling	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.I.	62	
Road paving	Yes	Yes	N.I.	No	Yes	No	No	No	69	
Improving the country's infrastructure	Yes	Yes	N.I.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	46	
Improving government facilities	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.I.	27	
Destruction of explosive artifacts	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	N.I.	N.I.	22	
Clearing of roads and cleaning of urban areas	Yes	Yes	N.I.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	38	
Support to NGOs and other humanitarian actors	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	74	
Support or Execution of QIP or ACISO	Yes	Yes	N.I.	Yes	Yes	Yes	N.I.	Yes	36	
Humanitarian actions in response to disasters	N.I.	Yes	Yes	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	Yes	39	
River Patrol	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	
Company Effective	250	250	250	250	177	177	120	120	-	

Source: (Own elaboration based on BRASIL [2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015a, 2017]).

The data collected can also be presented in execution frequency¹⁰ format, as shown in the table below:


Table 4 – Frequency of occurrence of work categories by contingent

No.	Category	Yes	No or N.I.	Execution frequency
1	Well drilling	15	2	88.24%
2	Road paving	11	6	64.71%
3	Improving the country's infrastructure	16	1	94.12%
4	Improving government facilities	9	8	52.94%
5	Destruction of explosive artifacts	9	8	52.94%
6	Clearing of roads and cleaning of urban areas	14	3	82.35%
7	Support to NGOs and other humanitarian actors	13	4	76.47%
8	Support or Execution of QIP or ACISO	13	4	76.47%
9	Humanitarian actions in response to disasters	4	13	23.53%
10	River Patrol	14	3	82.35%

Source: (Own elaboration based on BRASIL [2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015a, 2017]).

Data analysis and inferences

Analyzing the data in Table 3b, it can be seen that job categories 1, 2, and 7 have the highest number of reported executions during the mission period ($n > 60$), followed by categories 3, 6, 8, and 9 at an intermediate level ($60 > n > 30$), with categories 4 and 5 having the lowest number of reported actions ($n < 30$). In Table 4, it can be seen that job categories 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10 ($n > 70\%$) were those that occurred most frequently in the reports, categories 2, 4, and 5 occurred in an intermediate frequency range ($70\% > n > 50\%$) and only category 9 had a frequency below 50% occurrence. Cross-referencing the data from the two tables, it can be seen that categories 1 and 7 are in both the high frequency and large quantity of work done, followed by categories 2, 3, 6, and 8, which are in a higher category in one of the questions and intermediate in the other. Categories 5 and 9 are in the lowest quadrant in one of the questions, and intermediate in the others. The crossing of the data can be better visualized in graph 1, below:



Source: (Own elaboration based on BRASIL [2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015a, 2017]).

¹⁰ Refers to the percentage of contingents that performed the work category (Number of "Yes"/Total contingents x 100).

Among the categories of work analyzed there is a great prevalence of category 1 (well drilling), which occurs in practically all the contingents. This type of work impacts the population in one of its basic needs: access to drinking water. In a country with the physiographic characteristics of Haiti, which are still aggravated by the lack of basic sanitation, access to potable water is a factor of great relevance for the quality of life and health maintenance of the population. Other categories that were considered most relevant were number 2 (Road Paving), 3 (Improving the country's infrastructure), and 6 (Clearing the roads and cleaning up urban areas). This type of work results in changing the environment, which impacts people's perception of the overall improvement in the quality of life, as well as reinforcing the idea that the mission was also working for the general benefit of the population.

From the analysis of the data surveyed, in addition to the accounts available in the reports, we can infer some characteristics of BRAENGCOY's work that served as a factor generating attraction and sympathy in the Haitian population:

1. Active search in carrying out actions for the benefit of the population: BRAENGCOY's mandates, at first, did not foresee its employment in actions aimed at supporting the population (BRAZIL, 2006a), which Boutelles and Smith (2014) call "a role unrelated to mission support." However, it is observed that, since the first contingents, there was a concern to meet the wishes of the community through actions that would benefit it (WALKER, 2016). To get around this gap in the mandate, the company took advantage of its role of performing actions for the benefit of the tactical framework of the base gun to execute works that also had a social impact, as Cezne (2016, our translation) noted in his research:

Contingent military engineering elements, such as the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY), are also considered as vital elements for a multidimensional peacekeeping approach, for supporting or implementing other types of projects, within which the QIPs. Interviewees from BRAENGCOY pointed out that its activities, even though the mandate assigns it a primary mission to support infrastructure or operations related to MINUSTAH, eventually sought some kind of legacy for Haitians.

2. Ability to reach various social classes: Another characteristic of engineering works is the possibility of reaching various strata of society with the same action (BOUTELLIS; SMITH, 2014; PARROTT, 2010; WILLIAMS, 2005). While humanitarian assistance work tends to preferentially target the lower classes of the population, usually the most vulnerable, engineering work can reach everyone indiscriminately, especially in a country lacking infrastructure like Haiti. The paving of a highway affects all of its users indistinctly, whether they are car owners, public transport users, or pedestrians. The same can be said for a rainwater pipe service, sewage system installation, etc. These other social strata, which normally have little impact on ACISO, are important because they usually contain elements in leadership roles and opinion leaders, which contributes to the achievement of a favorable attitude toward the mission. Categories 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 best fit this characteristic, because their effects are felt indistinctly by all strata of society, even though the factors of this impact are different in each one.

3. Durability of the work: ACISO, for the most part, tends to focus on the immediate needs of the needy population, such as the distribution of water, food, clothing, health promotion campaigns, and has an ephemeral character. Despite the importance of these activities, their impact is more limited in time, requiring periodic repetition for their effects to be maintained. Most engineering works, on the other hand, are characterized by durability, that is, they remain materialized on the ground for long periods. The best example of engineering work of great impact and duration is well drilling, because it meets a basic need of the population, reaches a large number of people, and remains operational for long periods. Perhaps for this reason, this type of work is a constant in virtually every contingent.

The population sees the engineering component differently because they know that something will be left as a legacy; furthermore, the impacts of peace operations end up being more visible through engineering because they deliver something that will be materialized on the ground.... (CEZNE, 2016)

4. Change in the environment: Engineering works have the capacity to substantially alter the surrounding environment, changing the psychosocial effects tied to it. An example of this can be seen in an excerpt from the 3rd contingent's report:

Recovering the Peace Square: The area around the Peace Square in Bel Air had been practically pacified by B Inf F Paz¹¹. However, the sense of security in this area had not yet been assimilated by the local population. Cia E F Paz¹² carried out ACISO for the revitalization of the square, with the recuperation of the playground, painting, and grass cutting. Children flocked to the area, followed by adults. This mission was essential to externalize to the Haitians the return of security to normality. The mission lasted about 7 days. The result was quite significant, contributing to normalize the circulation of the local inhabitants in the area. (BRASIL, 2006b).

Urban intervention actions contribute to the generation of a sense of normality, which is more difficult to achieve by other means. The effects of the urban environment on the quality of life of the population are known and addressed by authors such as Wilson and Kelling (1982) and Borja and Muxí (2003). With the engineering troops acting on this factor, the actions to contain criminality have a greater degree of impact, becoming associated with the improvement of the quality of life in the region. This perception contributes to a better acceptance of the disruptions caused by the action of security forces by allowing the population to perceive the direct benefits brought by them, as Boutellis and Smith (2014) report:

A positive example of synergy between a substantive section of a peace mission and its military engineers is the "Wharf Jérémie" project. [...] This was a win-win situation. It helped improve the image of the MINUSTAH military component in these communities (where MINUSTAH also conducted robust operations against gangs, with the support of the Haitian police) reduced cost to the mission.

Categories 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 best represent this inherent ability of engineering troops to modify the environment for the sake of a perceived improvement in people's quality of life.

¹¹ Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion

¹² Peacekeeping Engineering Company

Looking at the data and inferences presented, it can be concluded that the engineering troop contributed to the generation of a feeling of attraction about the Haitian population at all levels. Without this support, the actions of the peacekeepers could have caused a feeling of popular revulsion similar to the one that already existed against the PNH or against the "man in uniform", jokingly called "Eiu"¹⁵ by the local population. However, the employment of engineering in achieving works of great popular appeal, visibility, and durability enabled the creation of a feeling that life was genuinely improving (MORAES; ANDRADE; MATTOS, 2013, p. 102).

The Engineering Company's work also did not go unnoticed during the 2010 earthquake, and its performance was considered highly relevant. According to General Floriano Peixoto (2017),

The Peace Force Engineering Company was engaged beyond the doctrinal limits of employment and remained so, even considerable time elapsed after the earthquake, as its effects still lingered. It is therefore quite a difficult task to list the work done by the engineers, but nothing that was done to help the victims and minimize the effects of the earthquake was done without their participation. However, due to the impact on immediate measures, some tasks should be exemplified, not only because of the urgency they demanded, but also for public health reasons, such as the removal of bodies from the streets and rubble and the preparation of collective burial sites, under the guidance of the International Red Cross.

It is also worth noting that the impact of these works was not limited to the Haitian people. The other countries that comprised the mission were also directly impacted by BRAENGCOPY's actions, considering that many of them benefited from facility improvement works conducted by the company, as reported by the 2nd contingent commander:

Because [Engineering Company] Haiti is providing support to the implementation of MINUSTAH logistics, with increased troop well-being, the repercussions of the subunit's work are being very well regarded among the various troops employed in the theater of operations. (BRAZIL, 2006a)

In this situation, it is also observed that the joint action of the two forms of power, hard and soft, in BRAENGCOPY's action. By being the engineering troop with the greatest combat power present in the field, the company showed the operational capacity of the Brazilian Army, while working to improve the quality of life of other countries' troops, it spread a feeling of benevolence on the part of Brazilians. In this way, the company was also, in itself, a smart power generating instrument vis-à-vis the component countries of the mission.

Final considerations

Through its performance as the leading country of the MINUSTAH military forces, Brazil grew internationally, gaining prestige within the United Nations, which was also reflected in other supranational

¹⁵ The expression "eiu" is derived from the English "Hey, you", the way US soldiers used to address Haitians, when they were part of another peace mission in the country, MINUHA.

institutions. We can say that the application of national power under the smart power approach has enabled Brazil to raise the bar, being recognized as an actor capable of acting not only by using means of attraction, but also by the combination of strength and cooperation, worked in a synergistic way, in order to achieve more expressive results, as noted Cezne (2016, p. 91).

The recognition of the success of Brazil's performance in MINUSTAH can be proven by facts such as the appointment, in 2013, of General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz to the position of Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Between 2006 and 2009, General Santos Cruz held a similar position in MINUSTAH, where troops fought intense battles and achieved the pacification of important communities, such as *Bel Air* and *Cité Militaire* (CAVALCANTI, 2014). Along with his appointment, the UN authorized, for the first time in history, a peacekeeping force to take the initiative to pursue and destroy combatant forces involved in a conflict (BOECHAT, 2014). During his tenure, Brazil was the only country in the world to have two Force Commanders acting at the same time. Another fact indicating Brazil's increased relevance in the peace operations scene was the invitation from the United Nations for Brazil to join the peace forces in more complex missions, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

The use of engineering troops as an element of soft power and the transformation of hard power into smart power, as shown in the article, has contributed to Brazil's recognition in the UN peace mission scenario. This concern with working in a dual manner—being useful to the supported troops as well as to the local population—is another characteristic of what has been called the Brazilian way of peacekeeping—a Brazilian way of conducting peace missions—based on good humour and the creation of bonds that facilitate the rapprochement with the local community (MAGUIRE, 2009).

Although not common within the UN, the generation of smart power by combining base-weapon troops with engineering has been observed in other environments, such as counter-insurgency operations (HEYRES, 2013; NYE, 2011; PARROTT, 2010). Within the national scenario, the combination of using infantry troops and engineers simultaneously in a peacekeeping mission, with an approach similar to that employed in Haiti, is a unique and successful experience. If the country participates in future peace missions with a similar composition of forces, it would be of great relevance to further study this synergistic performance as a strategy to obtain better results for the achievement of peacekeeping objectives and the projection of the Brazilian image abroad.

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ABSTRACT

This article addresses the way the work performed by the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCY) produced the soft power needed to convert the action of the Brazilian troops at MINUSTAH into smart power. The study presents a profiling of the Brazilian military power deployed in the mission, represented by the security and stabilization forces, and the way that their actions contributed to show its hard power to the world. Following to this, it analyses BRAENGCY's work, with a focus on those who had a direct impact on the Haitian population, which made it exceed its traditional role as a combat power multiplier agent to also become an attraction power producer, a soft power component. Lastly, it was performed an analysis of the engineering jobs characteristics which favored the soft power production, in order to allow the observation of the advantages of the deployment of engineering troops in peacekeeping missions for the attainment of the smart power synergic effect, by the blend of hard and soft power.

Key-words: Peacekeeping; MINUSTAH; BRAENGCY.

RESUMO

Este artigo aborda a maneira pela qual o trabalho realizado pela Companhia de Engenharia de Forças de Paz (BRAENGCY) brasileira resultou na geração do *soft power* necessário para que a atuação das tropas de paz brasileiras da MINUSTAH se convertesse em *smart power*. O estudo apresenta uma caracterização do poder militar do Brasil presente na missão, representado pelas forças de segurança e estabilização, e a forma pela qual a sua atuação contribuiu para demonstrar o *hard power* brasileiro para o mundo. Em seguida, analisa o trabalho realizado pela BRAENGCY, com um enfoque naqueles que tiveram um impacto direto na população haitiana, o que fez com que ela ultrapassasse o seu papel tradicional de elemento multiplicador do poder de combate para se tornar também em gerador de poder de atração, característica do *soft power*. Por fim, foi realizada uma análise das características dos trabalhos realizados que favoreceram a geração do *soft power*, de forma a permitir a observação das vantagens do emprego de tropas de engenharia nas operações de paz para a obtenção do efeito sinérgico do *smart power* pela combinação de *hard* e *soft power*.

Palavras-chave: Operações de Paz; MINUSTAH; BRAENGCY.

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