MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ARMED FORCES ACTIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA: AN APPRECIATION ABOUT THE REGIONAL DEFENSE CONVERGENCE

Graciela De Conti Pagliari¹

Introduction

Almost a decade after the formation of the Defense Council (SADC²) under the auspices of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) it is now possible to analyse it since its formative condition and to consider the impacts of this arrangement among the countries of the region. Several studies (Villa 2017a, 2017b; Nolte 2018) have been carried out in order to balance regional institutionalization and the regular trend to maintain military and political crises. The SADC was created with the aim of "implementing defense policies in military cooperation, humanitarian action and peace operations, defense industry and technology, training and capacity building". The dimension of defense, therefore, is the guiding element of the Council’s actions and the reason why the Council was designed as a forum for consultation, cooperation and coordination.

Considering its main objectives such as consolidating a South American peace zone, building a common vision for defense and generating consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in this area, this article proposes to analyze SADC and its capacity for regional regimentation in defense matters. Therefore, whether the creation of the SADC reduced the costs of regional

¹ Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Catarina. Master’s degree from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. PhD from the University of Brasilia. E-mail: graciela.pagliari@gmail.com.
² SADC, as in South American Defense Council in English (CDS in Portuguese).
transactions as it allowed for greater institutionalization of regional coopera-
tion.

When the SADC was established, Brazil was an active country in
the quest for seeking regional consensus for its creation. The conjuncture
presented conditions conducive to a greater development of regional institu-
tionalization – what was perceived and used as an asset by the government
of President Lula –, which used this condition to bring the South American
countries together in this new regional enterprise. The occasion seemed to
indicate that the non-participation of the United States in the newly created
body revealed a positive scope for building a region that clearly had concerns
about the same security issues but had not yet jointly constructed proposi-
tions for answers as it ran into disparities essentially about militarizing them
or not.

The limited capacity of action of the hemispheric mechanisms in rela-
tion to the problems that South America presented, as well as the focus of the
United States to other regions of the world, were associated with a positive
period of economic growth and a decrease in regional political instabilities.
But this threshold between regional stability and internal instabilities can be
seen as a truly changing condition in South America.

The propelled peace ring does not hold up as an image of the situa-
tion of the region, which can be highlighted in important – but not exhaustive
examples: since 2001 Plan Colombia was used to put an end to the guer-
rillas whose contestatory movement challenged the instability of Colombian
institutions; in 2006 the Media Luna crisis occurred in Bolivia, with Unasur
playing a prominent role in this concertation; in 2008 the invasion of the
Colombian armed forces into Ecuadorian territory highlighted the historical

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4 Cepik (2009, 76-77) points out that the sources of insecurity in the region are predominantly
domestic, and the United States – even though focused especially on the counter-terrorism
agenda – does not neglect its status as a regional hegemon. In addition, the author, looking
at the overall picture of the South American security complex in that period, points out to a
moment of advance in the development of “a growing institutionalization of dispute settlement
processes through a multiplicity of organizations, such as the Amazon Cooperation Treaty
Organization (ACTO), Mercosur, Andean Community (CAN) and, as the main challenge, the
Union of South America Nations (Unasur”).

5 In a speech at the announcement of the national defense policy on November 7, 1996, the
then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso asserted that “The priority that the Government
has been giving to the stabilization of the economy and the attendance of social programs,
without attending fully meet the needs of reequipment defense bodies, it is largely due to the
true peace ring built around the Country.”

6 Citing the example of Media Luna, Serbin (2009) highlights Brazil’s strategy of dealing with
regional stability turbulence.
rivalries in the Andean arc – Operation Phoenix extrapolates the bilateral dispute especially since the consequences indicate a growing tension and a securitization of the region; in 2015 Venezuelan troops, in an apparent ambush, were attacked in San Antonio del Táchira, which led to the closure of the border by the Venezuelan government, further damaging the already fragile relations between both countries.

Concerning the international system, the moment pointed out to a scenario in which the intermediate powers enjoyed a broader capacity for action than it was possible in the Cold War decades, especially in South America, since the region is separated from the main theaters of operations and the remaining superpower has developed a low profile of performance in this area.

The reactions towards the creation of Unasur affected the sensitive conflict-cooperation threshold for the second path when, in response to the Colombian invasion of Ecuador, Unasur and later the SADC come into play. The multilateralism generated by Unasur placed regional relations at a different level, which forms a favorable scenario for the rapprochment and for the development of multilateral cooperation on defense issues, traditionally relegated to a bilateral or trilateral level.

Brazil’s most assertive international performance at that time highlights the role that Buzan and Waever (2003) have placed for Brazil as a link between the north and south of the region, one that, due to its dynamics – whether in the Southern Cone or in the Andean North – made the Regional Security Complex (RSC) of South America stand as one, with two security sub-regions. Thus, nothing more natural than assuming a decisive role in the process of approximation that aimed at regional defense, but also reached the international projection of the country in a broader way.

The proactivity highlighted by Villa and Viana (2010) and the assertiveness defined by Soares de Lima (2010) are demonstrated in issues such as the mediation with Turkey over the Iranian nuclear program\(^7\), the formation of the National Defense Strategy document (2008), but also by the leadership in the Unasur proposal and the SADC. The formation of a Defense Council to strengthen defense dialogue and consensus through the promotion of confidence and transparency measures and to promote the reduction of asymmetries between the defense systems of the member states\(^8\) and a deci-

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\(^7\) It generated the Tehran Declaration in 2010 between Iran, Turkey and Brazil.

\(^8\) According to the Consultative Statute of the South American Defense Council, item II – principles, article 3, paragraphs d and i.
The decision-making process defined by consensus⁹, is an unprecedented creation in terms of cooperation and coordination in South American defense. Solidifying the convergences would allow an approximation with regard to defense, which could reduce the disparities that generated regional crises.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether the cooperation proposed by the SADC is in the positive direction of its implementation. Methodologically the work will address the development of defense cooperation through confidence-building measures, especially in relation to military expenditures and missions assigned to the armed forces. Both variables will allow for a special focus on one of the four actions proposed by the SADC with regard to the implementation of defense policies on military cooperation. The first is justified because the promotion of dialogue and consensus on defense by increasing confidence and transparency measures is one of the objectives of the SADC; and the second, because it is also intended to reduce asymmetries between Member States’ defense systems. For the sense of mission of the forces is an important foundation for analyzing the progress in defense cooperation, since it is assumed that the security issues facing the region reflected in different expectations about what the role of the armed forces should be when combating such threats.

The text is divided into an introductory presentation section of the discussion, a second section that examines military spending and confidence-building measures through SADC as a way of minimizing the possibility of security dilemmas and, on the other, to produce a regional instance of defense. In the third segment, we can observe the attributions of the armed forces of the region in the post-Cold War period in order to observe if the differences in security are being solved by the actions adopted from the SADC, since this is a hindrance to be overcome. The final remarks try to return to the points worked to see if the consensus has advanced to the detriment of the divergences. That is to say, if the costs of regional institutionalization in defense were overcome through SADC in order to test the hypothesis that the South American countries only tend to approximate insofar as their costs are less tied to the change of their individual policies tending, therefore, to superficial consensus to the detriment of the adoption and incorporation of joint policies.

**A Measure to strengthen cooperation: military spending**

This section tries to evaluate an important point in the construction of

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⁹ According to article 13 of the Consultative Statute.
a regional institutionality, which is based on the military expenses and their effects in terms of regional defense. In an area that has traditionally been marked by force demonstrations, even if not through war, military spending and its purposes are essentially important.

The regional agenda has focused on investments in confidence-building measures\(^\text{10}\) to increase cooperation as a way to mitigate suspicions and thereby to modify the relations between the dyads and triads in order to change the calculation of the actors on the basis of tension relations, traditional frontier conflicts, and demonstrations of force, for distensions that would allow forming relations of proximity. Only with them is it possible to aim for regional institutionalization in defense. By acting in this way, countries accumulate an asset on the regional agenda that will serve to increase the degree of transparency and trust needed to coordinate defense policies.

Defense expenditures are a good measure of whether actions on defense will create a security dilemma between states. Even though expenditures are much smaller in Latin America in general than in other regions of the world, suspicions and rivalries are exacerbated by every movement of military investment. The Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe (2016), produced by RESDAL, presents the values of defense expenditures in Latin America for the period 2006 to 2016, showing that the average defense budget in the region was 3.7% in relation to the State budget. This percentage is not insignificant, quite the opposite. Therefore, we intend to show in this work the destinations of these resources and their uses among different items.

It was decided to consider confidence-building measures as an indicator of the rapprochement and consensus among States, following the objectives outlined by the SADC. The discussion on the adoption of measurement measures of military expenditures has developed more assertively in the Americas since the mid-1990s. An important outcome of these discussions was reached at the 2004 Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, when it was reiterated that “budget transparency is a key factor in security and defense cooperation, which is conducive to the implementation of methodologies for measuring defense spending as an optimal mechanism of mutual trust” (CEED 2017, 58).

In 2010, the countries established Procedimientos de Aplicación para las Medidas de Fomento de la Confianza y Seguridad which considers (I) the exchange of information and transparency regarding (A) defense systems and

\(^{10}\) A discussion on confidence-building measures and their use in the region can be seen in Rojas Aravena (1996); Flames (2005); and Saint-Pierre and Palacios Junior (2014).
(B) defense spending; as well as those related to (II) intra and extra-regional activities, in addition to (III) security measures and (IV) guarantees on the proscription of the use of force, a nuclear-weapon-free zone, respect for international law in defense cooperation agreements and assurance of non-use of those against sovereignty, security, stability and territorial integrity of members; and (V) compliance and verification measures to be carried out through the voluntary mechanism for visits to military installations, contact and military cooperation programs and verification of situations in border areas, to be developed with the collaboration of an international organization.

With respect to defense spending, they agreed to inform them and subsequently to approve the information provided and to set up a standard for standardized measurement of these expenses. The Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Defensa (CEED) began to consolidate data on defense spending and, to the moment, has released three documents with the relative information: “Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa (2006-2010)”, published in December 2014; “Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa 2011-2013”, published in May 2016, and “Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa 2006-2015”, published in January, 2017.

The establishment of a common methodology since 2011 for the measurement of defense spending is established considering a definition of spending that includes all the resources allocated by the State to finance the activities that make up the Nation’s external security. It also includes the foreign aid received for this purpose (monetary and non-monetary). From the institutional point of view, this means considering the expenditures of the Armed Forces and its agencies, and all other public sector bodies whose main role is to defend the country against external challenges (central government added to decentralized entities).

It is excluded from the concept of defense expenditure those carried out by the State to protect its internal security, including the use of the Armed Forces, i.e. the costs of police, gendarmerie, coast guard, civil aviation control bodies and maritime safety control bodies (CEED 2017, 61).

The methodology adopted defines the main axes of measurement of the Registry to (I) classification by object of expenditure and by agency of execution of the same and (II) guidelines for the presentation format of the series. The executing agency has also been classified independently and these

11 South American budget in Defense (translation note).
are the Ministry of Defense, the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces; the Army; the Marine; the Air Force; and, if applicable, Others.

In relation to the object, defense expenditure is divided as follows:

1) personnel (remuneration);
2) operations and maintenance (consumer goods and services);
3) investments (weapons systems, physical infrastructure and other equipment);
4) research and development.

During the period with tabulated data that starts in 2006 and goes until 2015, regional defense expenditure can be observed as a percentage of regional GDP with an average of 0.98%, as can be seen in the table below. As already pointed out, these figures are substantially below the world average and may be an indication that the countries of the region consider unlikely disputes between regional or extra-regional state actors. But another indication that may help to understand the military spending percentages is that, broadly, the countries of the region are very concerned about problems within them, such as high rates of violence, and the figures presented do not include figures for public safety through civil and military police.

The challenge of shaping the region as a zone of peace is not only due to low military expenditures, but also through confidence relations that the expenditures – even if in a small amount – are not created to threaten other countries in the region, as regional rivalries embodied by means of balances of power.

If during the 2006 to 2014 period there were constant increases in
relation to the values\textsuperscript{12} of the military expenditures, it is observed that in the year 2015 there is a considerable reduction (of more than 14%), returning to levels at the beginning of the decade. Many factors may explain such a reduction as the economic crisis plaguing several states in the region – a crisis that also reflected in the reduction of military expenditure in Europe and the US –; the political crisis and institutional instability in Brazil and Venezuela; the demobilization of the FARC in Colombia that impacts on the allocation of US military assistance values to that country.

Consolidated defense spending shows that personnel costs represent the largest destination. While regional investment expenditures show considerable variation over the period, as will be discussed below, personnel expenditures remain constant, with a pronounced upward trend ranging from 62.76% in 2006 to 67.49% in 2015.

The investments contribute to an average of 17.18% of the resources, being the third\textsuperscript{13} object in expenses during the period. Included in this item are:

(I) weapons system – acquisition and modernization of military equipment for defense, such as tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft and helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, among others;

(II) physical infrastructure (which includes the cost of building facilities and acquisitions of movable property), and

(III) other equipment such as acquisition and modernization of vehi-

\textsuperscript{12} Considered in dollars.

\textsuperscript{13} First is the personal item, followed by percentages of operation and maintenance.
cles, aircraft, logistical support ships, machinery and equipment (transport, health, communications, computing ...) and intangibles (licenses, special licenses ...).

Research and development, in turn, presents percentages less than 1% of the amount invested, as shown in the table above. In other words, the actions essential for obtaining new knowledge and/or research of their applications based on technological development initiatives, innovation for production for the defense and generation of new knowledge, is relegated to the lowest level among the destinations of the resources.

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One of the important percentages to be analyzed refers to investments. Regarding defense spending, there is a decrease in relation to this percentage over the years. In 2006, the percentage in that item was 13.58%; in 2013 was the year with the highest percentage invested with 21.57% and in 2015, the last year of the consolidated data, the percentage was 10.19%, totaling an average of 17.18% in the period 2006-2015 which show a variation quite important in a period of a decade and a half of sampling.

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As it can be seen in the graph below, the percentages disaggregated in relation to the subcomponents reflect this same trajectory of variation. The weapons system presents a percentage of 51.86% in 2006 (by the way its highest percentage) then is reduced to 25.36% in 2012 and ends 2015 with 33.21%. On the other hand, the Other Equipment subcomponent ends the period with an increasing trend. In 2006 it represents 36.99%, in 2010 (the lowest percentage) is at 33.33% and ends 2015 with the percentage of 51.77%.

In a first evaluation, there can be an inconsistency of values that demonstrates how countries are susceptible to change the values of the expenses from the financial limitations/constraints. Long-term projects, such as weapons systems, require investments over a number of years until they are consolidated. Even though, in terms of GDP, regional military expenditures do not show large variations, nominally the impact is significant since the non-growth of GDP or its fall represents a nominal reduction of investments. Another significant issue to think about in this respect is that after the Colombian invasion of Ecuadorian territory in 2008, the region did not present any more significant regionalized securitization situation, but this should not necessarily reflect immediately about it because what is significant here are long-term projects.

Considering the results that the reports themselves represent, some conclusions can be highlighted, especially in relation to the units that spend the most
The Army stands out as the most important unit of expenditure, spending (sic) 42.48% of the total regional expenditure of the decade; however, from 2006 to 2014 there has been an increase of more than 600% in the execution of expenditures by the Ministries of Defense (CEED 2017, 53).

Also worth mentioning is the unprecedented methodological design of the expenditure record in defense, a factor that demonstrates the building of trust and transparency among States, since – after numerous meetings and negotiations – the measurement parameters outlined were agreed upon. Here there is a clear example of concerted action on defense issues, which could demonstrate that the SADC is in a position to be an effective regional governance mechanism, in spite of all the divergences to be overcome. The Report highlights

According to the characteristics of the methodological design, the South American Register of Spending in Defense is an unprecedented instrument that does not count on parallels at the global level. Indeed, while the defense spending reports of some of the international organizations (governmental or non-governmental) dedicated to the matter are constructed on the basis of budgetary projections, the South American Registry elaborates on the defense expenditures effectively executed by each Member State and officially informed annually to the South American Defense Council (CEED 2017, 53).

The political will and consensus that Unasur members have reached in terms of verification of military expenditures is highlighted by the CEED (Annex 4, Preliminary Report) that cooperation in the defense sector respects national differences and particularities, but also uses the coincident elements to advance the strategic complementarities. In this sense, the costs linked to the approximation should be reduced.

It is not possible to present more conclusions regarding the values themselves in the sense of their representativeness in relation to the formation of regional balances since the data are integrated for all countries. However, for purposes of this article, it can be said that the purpose of verifying defense spending contributes to building trust in South America.

In the next section, consideration will be given to the rapprochement in terms of defense from the verification of the assignments that the countries assign to their armed forces. It is hoped, therefore, to verify whether this point of divergence has also been modified for greater thematic and mission convergence.
Armed forces attributions in the post-Cold War and their defense role in South America\textsuperscript{14}

Latin America in general and South America in particular, had come back to democratic regimes in the period coinciding with the final years of the Cold War, which greatly influenced relations between the armed forces and political systems. Thus, while the South American area was affected by the systemic changes, changes within the region and the states also took place, significantly impacting both the expectation of the armed forces’ procedure and the region’s security and defense concerns.

The consolidation of democratization processes crystallizes politico-military relations. And it starts to question both the military investments and the need for the States to have such large equipment. According to the postmodern post-Cold War military trend, the country’s armed forces and decision-makers are faced with this change that is taking place in various parts of the world to assign to militaries the tasks that are not traditionally theirs as well as putting them on international missions under the auspices of organizations such as the UN or even acting in combined organizations – such as Eurocorps (Garcia 2002).

During this period, the constitution of an atmosphere of disbelief or almost impossibility of a conflict between national States was presented. The region’s armed forces had lost the domestic role played during the bipolarity, and they also encountered the absence of an external enemy. Thus, it was difficult to justify robust military apparatus. Although it has traditionally been one of the least areas in the world in terms of military investments, the questioning of resource allocation to the forces was present, based on motives such as internal political changes, resentment and economic problems (Aguilar 2008).

The previous dictatorial period and society’s perception of the armed forces greatly influenced such questions, which were also based on the low or scant transparency of military procurement processes\textsuperscript{15}. In the immediate

\textsuperscript{14} A preliminary version of this section was published in the chapter “Armed Forces and their Importance for the La Plata Southern Region”, in the book Contemporary Comparative Frontiers: International Relations and Regional Security in Brazil and the European Union, 2016.

\textsuperscript{15} The elaboration of White Papers aims to modify this scenario, but it will be seen that Brazil only establishes its LBDN in 2012 (White Book on National Defense, in English). Even though National Defense Policies and the National Defense Strategy have been created before, it is the White Paper that represents the transparency in defense matters and progress in the process of consolidating civilian power over the military. The LBDN update published in 2012 was
post-Cold War period, military investments experience a percentage reduction in GDP, as shown by the percentages below.

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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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Source: elaborated by the author based on data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2015.

With this reduction, it is possible to change the situation of distrust that persisted among the countries of the region, as well as to create the conditions for military forces to participate in joint meetings that are the basis for military confidence-building exercises between the countries of the Southern Cone (Pagliari 2004).

Otherwise, despite the pressure to act on the so-called new threats, the military did not incorporate such a mission. Donadio (2003, 8 – our translation) states that “... the armed forces of the region have remained in general (with the obvious exception of Colombia) distant from pressures to engage in tasks such as the fight against drug trafficking”. Whether this internal action was strongly opposed by the Latin American and South American forces themselves, the proposal to employ them in international situations such as UN blue helmets did not find the same resistance. On the contrary, the countries began to allocate contingents for this preparation and performance that became very constant thereafter.

prepared in 2016 and submitted to the National Congress for consideration.

16 The SIPRI database uses both percentages of GDP and current and constant dollar values. It was decided to use the table based on the GDP because these data show a proportion in relation to the amount of the expenditures of the State, which the values in dollars do not always show, since they appear isolated from the whole.

17 In the original: “... las fuerzas armadas de la región se han mantenido en general (con la obvia excepción de Colombia) apartadas de presiones para introducirse en tareas tales como la lucha contra el narcotráfico”.

18 The Brazilian defense documents prepared in 2016 underscore the importance of
Diamint (2006) points out that democratization was designed with the central task of regaining control of military structures, but whether this purpose has been somewhat achieved, the same cannot be said of the rational and planned organization of defense. The author presents that

The deficit in the production of security policies (considering the term in its expanded conception), contradict efforts to strengthen the democratic system. This lack of leadership and management is reinforced by the exponential growth of public insecurity, which produces a possible overlap between defense functions and police functions, contrary to the necessary republican separation between external defense and internal public order (Diamint 2006, 59 – our translation)\(^9\).

With an exterior that presented almost no prospects of conflict, but with internal situations that showed a growing challenge in terms of public security with an increasing impact on the daily lives of its citizens, the region uses the armed forces as an institutional response. Saint-Pierre and Donadelli (2016, 89) assert that

in some cases, either because of institutional deficiencies, due to urgency of the electoral agenda, due to fatigue of democracy or even because of the lack of preparation of civilians to carry out political conduction in the areas of public security and defense, the governments of the region were, in a more and on a wider variety of missions, using its Armed Forces as the only available, efficient, and reliable institution. In some cases, this generalized use of the Forces promotes dangerous constitutional changes to their legitimation; in others, it is promoted in clear disagreement with the constitutional precepts, leaving the military to fulfill these functions in a legal limbo and without any legal coverage.

In the young democracies of the region, it is interesting to observe how in most of them (the greatest exception being Argentina) the armed forces are identified as the institution linked to the State that generates the most confidence. The 2016 Latinobarómetro report shows that confidence in institutions decreased from the previous period, with the exception of the armed

peacekeeping operations in a significant way, with the intention to continue assigning contingents to this task.

\(^9\) In the original: “Este déficit de conducción y gestión se refuerza por el exponentencial crecimiento de la inseguridad pública, que produce una eventual superposición entre las funciones de defensa con las funciones policiales, contrariando la necesaria separación republicana entre defensa externa y ordem público interno”.
forces and the police, with slight increases, from 36% to 38%, and from 66% to 69%. The average confidence on the armed forces in the period 1995-2016 is 47%, being the public institution best placed in terms of confidence. This demonstration of confidence is not due to its role in wars, as the same report stresses “without wars, Latin America accuses violence, corruption and inequality as the most powerful phenomena that hold back democracy” (Latinobarómetro 2016, n.d. – our translation).

However, despite regional convergence on the intensification of military subordination to civilian power, neither the security and defense issues were adequately defined nor the question of what, in fact, permeates the national interest of the countries. Soares de Lima (2010, 409) points out that “if civilian control is one of the necessary conditions, it is not sufficient, since it lacks the political definition of the State that establishes objectives of its autonomy at the international level.”

In South America, considering the constitutional forecasts, all the countries of the region assign the national defense to the armed forces, on the other hand, only Brazil, Colombia and Bolivia, have as attribution the guarantee of the constitutional order. The guarantee of internal order is constitutionally attributed to the military in Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, while the guarantee of government stability is constitutional attribution in the Paraguayan and Bolivian constitutions.

Such predictions of mission may also be defined in laws complementary to the constitutions, such predictions of mission can also be defined in complementary laws to constitutions, as is the case of cooperation with respect to order (or internal security). In this case, it is observed that there is a predictability of this attribution in all the states of the region, except that, in the case of Argentina, this role only occurs in situations of state of exception.

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20 In turn, the data show that democracy had difficulties in consolidating itself because only 22% (a number that has fallen for several years) has the perception that incumbents govern for the whole population.

21 “Sin guerras, América Latina acusa violencia, corrupción y la desigualdad como los fenómenos mas potentes que retienen a la democracia” in the original.

22 Opposed to this trend to intensify the treatment of the civil-military issue, the Brazilian LBNDN, in the 2016 version – currently being discussed in the National Congress – fails to address this relationship. In the previous document there was a clear statement “emphasize that the obedience of the Armed Forces to the constitutional political power is presupposed of the republican regime and guarantee of the integrity of the Nation, being under the authority of the President of the Republic, through the Ministry of Defense” (LBNDN 2012, 56).

23 For a more precise analysis of the infra-constitutional legislations and internally employed situations of the armed forces in South American countries, see Saint-Pierre and Donadelli (2016).
because its performance is directed towards the external – whether traditional threats or even participation in peace operations. Saint-Pierre and Donadelli (2016: 94) point out that the South American legislations referring to military employment not related to national defense present distinct nomenclatures as allowing internal actions such as “1.) Guarantee of Constitutional Order/Stability Legal Government; 2.) Internal Order/Internal Security Guarantee; 3.) Participation in National Development; 4.) Support for electoral processes and 5.) Support in the event of a disaster”.

According to data from the Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe (2014), over time, the spectrum of actions developed by the Armed Forces has been expanded, in addition to maintaining peace, they have incorporated tasks related to cooperation in public security. In that year, 94% of the countries of the region carried out, on a regular basis, some activity or operation linked to public security, whether to combat drug trafficking, urban patrols, permanent border control, security of major events and pacification in violent zones. In the Atlas 2016, public security issues remain prominent within the security situation in the region. The 12th Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago from October 10 to 12, 2016, was aimed at strengthening hemispheric defense and security cooperation in an increasingly volatile global environment. Its thematic axes revolved around the evolution of the armed forces’ function, protection and responsiveness to environmental problems, and the cooperation and strengthening of humanitarian emergency assistance, as a clear demonstration of concern for public safety.

With regard to border operations, which are always highlighted and emphasized by Brazil24, they are much more linked to crimes such as guarding the border to restrict the entry of arms and ammunition, related to drug trafficking and guerrilla warfare than to eventual threats that other countries may pose in terms of traditional border threats, especially since traditional threats are latent rather than heavily securitized in the region. Since drug trafficking is one of the issues that has preoccupied countries25, even though the armed forces have not been employed in its fight – as Colombia does – there are operations in which they are employed due to their logistics and

25 According to the documents of the consultations held by the OAS during the discussion of hemispheric security mechanisms, which culminated in the 2003 Declaration of Security of the Americas.
From the above, it can be inferred that the armed forces are assigned, more and more comprehensively in terms of the number of countries, non-primary missions. Battaglino (2015) considers that in Argentina there was a low and supervised expansion, therefore, with a high level of civil control and with low political power of the military; in the case of Brazil the level of civilian control is low, but with an average expansion and with incipient civilian supervision, which leaves the political power of the military high. It is therefore inferred that neither the convergence of the role of the military or its missions was achieved because of the lack of definition or limitation of the themes of internal security and national defense.

The CEED in the Preliminary Report (2014) emphasizes that “the objectives of a possible conformation of a sub-regional defense system [emphasis in the original] are linked to the characterization and hierarchy of threats and risks of regional dimensions and impacts, which require cooperation and joint action by countries to address them collectively” (CEED 2014 – our translation). It recognizes that the classic defense issues are more coincident among States, and that the greatest discrepancies are in relation to the definitions of public security, which are urged to be remedied through processes of revision and redefinition of security policies and systems, but also related to defense.

While the classic defense issues are already consolidated, and the countries have not only been confronted with them for a long time, they are at a time when discrepancies have less room to develop because of non-imminence or, at least, of the low probability of consolidating a threat in these terms, security was impacted by the strong growth of the presence of non-state actors and the transnational dynamics resulting from it.

**Final remarks**

Over time, the countries of the so-called Latin America and, more recently, the countries that are part of the subcontinent of South America, have sought to integrate in a very broad way, including the defense area more re-

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26 Only Chile and Uruguay do not envisage the use of the armed forces for such operations (Atlas 2014).

27 In the original: “Los objetivos de la posible conformación de un sistema de defensa sub-regional, están vinculados a la caracterización y jerarquización de las amenazas y riesgos de dimensiones e impacto regionales, que requieran de una cooperación y acción de los países para enfrentarlos en forma colectiva”.
cently. If during the 20th century integration did not reach the conditions to consolidate, at the beginning of the 21st century the conditions of the international system seemed to converge to a scenario that would allow a more definitive approach.

In addition, there was a regional convergence of several governments demonstrating the desire for rapprochement and consensus building. Even if it was not possible to completely de-characterize its historical paradox of region with external stability and internal instability (Medeiros Filho 2010), confidence-building was advancing positively, especially in the Southern Cone sub-region, but also to some extent in the Andean northern portion with the ideological proximity of a number of political leaders, the formation of a regional defense mechanism – not of collective defense – was not viewed with suspicion or with clear intentions of detachment from the United States, actually, promoting a relative detachment.

Brazil adopted a position of proximity to its South American neighbors – in a moment of emphasis on regionalities28 –, it acted to consolidate its international position as an emerging country, and as a medium power with capacity to regiment the region, as well as the costs of the approach processes. Promoting political dialogue, a quest for multilateralism – from a discourse that propagated a cooperative multipolarity, as highlighted in the 2012 LBDN –, the country demonstrated South America’s leading role in its foreign policy and the priority that the region had in its international relations.

The creation of the SADC without identifying common opponents, without aiming to be a collective defense body, but aiming to consolidate the region as a zone of peace, create a South American defense identity and create consensus for the strengthening of regional cooperation in defense, because due to the possibility of a rapprochement that emerged after the change of relationship based on the projection of power between Brazil and Argentina in the late twentieth century, showed that in that ex-complex conflict the conditions for thinking about identity in defense were now placed.

However, over the years, consensus-building has not allowed the incorporation of joint regional policies. In countries with markedly traits of sovereignty and which formed an institution with a minimalist structure (Medeiros, Teixeira Júnior and Reis 2017), the intergovernmental form of SADC prevents a more comprehensive character in its conduct.

Another regional institutional challenge lies in the non-overcoming of border disputes, especially in the northern region. This shows that it is not

28 Especially with regard to this work Buzan and Waever (2003), but also Adler and Barnett (1998).
yet possible to think of a region that can converge in terms of defense. Note that even if these disputes are not completely resolved, they have a low securitization, but remain latent. However, it seems fair to say that they are less securitized – as in the examples of Colombia and Venezuela – more due to the internal situations of each of these countries than properly resulting from the constraints arising from regional institutionalization. Villa (2017, 95) shows the hybridism of security governance in Latin America, asserting that in the region the logic of the balance of power and the security community stands side by side, and these conditions impact both within the region and in individual countries, motivating or constraining militarized behavior.

The broad and comprehensive understanding of security or the concept of multidimensional security established in 2002 within the framework of the OAS leaves, on the one hand, an open space about what is meant by security and, likewise, by defense; but on the other hand, given such breadth of themes, it results in restrictions on the possibility of policy coordination.

Brazil plays a key role in the development of defense and security relations in the region, however, after its prominence in the creation of these institutions and a very defined position on the region being an important space in the search for a prominent and autonomous international insertion of the country in the world, in the last years this protagonism was left aside. Brazilian foreign policy did not follow the proactive action that resulted in the formation of this South American institutional framework.

A very significant question to consider is that Westphalian characteristics are quite significant in the region where countries are traditionally more often impacted by internal issues, turning to themselves quite frequently. This factor is very preponderant nowadays where Brazil has a low profile of foreign policy because it returns to its own problems of governability and political representativeness, leaving little or no space for the continuity of the implementation of the policies directed to the regional arrangements. In this sense, Unasur is no longer a priority for Brazil as a political project. Venezuela, in turn, with serious economic difficulties and social and political contestations faced by the government of Nicolás Maduro, has not relied on regional support for the resolution of the worrisome social and economic situation that the country has faced.

29 “…they recognize the threats, concerns and other challenges to security in the hemispheric context of diverse nature and multidimensional reach, and that the concept and traditional approaches should envision to comprehend new and non-traditional threats, that included political, economic, social, health and environmental issues.”, according to the Declaration of Bridgetown: Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security. Available in http://www.oas.org/juridico/portuguese/ 2002/agdec27.htm (our translation).
In the same sense, in observing the new defense documents, one can notice that Brazil neglects South America by not giving prominence to Unasur as a political project, which shows that the country, as the driving force of regional institutionalization, does not maintain a linearity and, to some extent, its current conduct dissociates itself from the policy of building a common defense vision and generating consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in this area.

In view of these conditions, some scenarios may be considered for the future of security and defense relations in the region. In the first, in an international context of expansion of multilateral spaces, the region may continue to invest institutionally in order to deepen cooperation agreements in defense and solidifying the regional space for its international insertion. On the other hand, if Brazil maintains a low foreign policy profile due to the maintenance and/or deepening of the internal economic and political instability – which will have serious regional institutional costs – the regional rapprochement will be very punctual, with only some bilateral relations going forward, strongly depending on the selective use of regional institutionalization.

Concertation visions led by measures such as the formation of mutual trust, especially to create rules for military procurement, and for military training and training, have been developed towards a cooperative vision, respecting the coexistence of different political and economic definitions besides of defense and security conceptualizations. This safeguard to the coexistence of different definitions produces a significant impact in relation to the limits that the possibility of convergences will present.

Distinct employments of the armed forces, as noted in the previous section, are a direct consequence of both the confusion between public security and defense, and the imprecise and broad definition of security. If national constitutions are less declaratory in this sense, infra-constitutional legislations – in most countries – define such actions. In the absence of strengthening of internal public security instruments, even with increasing levels of insecurity resulting from violence, but also from drug and arms trafficking, the solution has been presented as ambiguous. It was not achieved the convergence of the missions of the armed forces, nor has a possible change been produced, however the character of their actions is more and more related to security than to defense. This characteristic, however, does not become an innovation in the region since the fight against internal subversion was its focus for a long time. Even the creation of the SADC had only limited effects in generating an enough positive agenda to coordinate issues and perspectives of action in defense.

The results of the SADC approach were insufficient to modify bilateral
relations patterns, since ambiguity – especially not precisely defining security and defense issues – and the complexity of regional relations did not disappear. The costs of the regional operation are maintained and even if the levels of consensus and confidence have been advanced, they are not linear for all South American countries.

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Graciela De Conti Pagliari


ABSTRACT
It is investigated the approximation in defense and security in South America. The hypothesis tested considers that these countries just tend an approximation whereby the costs are less linked to a changing in their individual policies. In this way, they propose just a superficial consensus rather than incorporate joint policies. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the confidence measures in relation to the military expenditures adopted since the SADC foundation, as well as the military forces functions to verify if – in that instance – the measures served to empower the convergences in defense, and – in the case of these – if, in the face of the highlighted common defense problems, the attributions have converged.

KEYWORDS
South America; South American Defense Council; security and defense.

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